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States’ counterterrorism strategies have been categorized into the criminal justice and 
military models of counterterrorism.  Currently, the international relations literature lacks a 
systematic exploration or theorization of these models, and relies mainly on broad 
conceptualizations and piecemeal evidence to make claims in reference to these two 
counterterrorism models.   
This dissertation examines the conceptual literature on the criminal justice and military 
models of counterterrorism, further theorizes these models, and empirically analyzes both 
quantitatively and qualitatively using evidence from the United States.  Using data from the 
Global Terrorism Database and Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, spanning from 
1970 to 2014, the quantitative analysis looks predominantly at the military model of 
counterterrorism in order to determine its relationship with terrorism and relevant domestic 
political processes.  The qualitative analysis, comprised mainly of legal content analysis of the 
same temporal frame, investigates the conditions under which the models are employed, focusing 
especially on the criminal justice model.  The findings suggest that criminal justice responses are 
employed mainly against perpetrators from Western nations and U.S. allies, while military 
responses are disproportionately used against Muslim individuals, especially those affiliated with 
al-Qaeda, Taliban, and al Shabab.  The findings also suggest that both models have been equally 
employed before and after 9/11, calling into question claims from recent literature suggesting 
that military counterterrorism policy is a post-9/11 phenomenon.  Finally, the results indicate that 
terrorism both directly and indirectly impacts military activity in the U.S. and, contrarily, that 
military activity is associated with increases in future supplies of terrorism.  This suggests that 
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How do governments respond to terrorism?  What determines the choices of states’ 
counterterrorism strategies?  What are the domestic political effects of these strategies? States 
have an arsenal of counterterrorism tools at their disposal, designed to limit terrorist activity.  
The practical need for comprehensive counterterrorism strategies as a result of the recent 
increase in terrorist activity in the last half century gave rise to burgeoning literature.  However, 
this literature has not addressed these three questions in a systematic and theory-driven manner.  
This dissertation takes on the task of working with the existing literature to theorize the criminal 
justice and military models of counterterrorism in order to facilitate empirical investigation for 
the purpose of answering these questions.   
Many of the counterterrorism tools used by states fall into two categories commonly used 
in the literature on counterterrorism: criminal justice or military.  As a long standing element of 
counterterrorism policy, criminal justice measures of counterterrorism involve law enforcement, 
sanctions, detentions and prosecutions, and public diplomacy to name a few.  Military measures, 
which also have a long history worldwide for use in counterterrorism, include displays of force, 
such as raids, deployments, militarized conflict, targeted killings, among others, but also include 
other types of actions including border patrol, humanitarianism, and training.  Both types of 
responses have been regarded as effective in some analyses and as ineffective in others.  
Regardless of their evaluations, countries continue to employ criminal justice and military 
responses as their dominant strategies to counter the threat of terrorism.   
What we know about each of these types of counterterrorism responses in practice is that 
they are at times used independent of one another and at other times used sequentially and even 
simultaneously.  The choice of a particular counterterrorism strategy appears to be influenced by 




and the type and severity of the attack committed, among other considerations.  Nevertheless, 
both appear to be employed consistently and frequently in recent history of states’ responses to 
terrorism.   
This research situates itself into the camp of International Relations terrorism and 
counterterrorism literature.  In addition, it utilizes aspects of criminological approaches to 
preventing and combatting terrorism, especially as regards the criminal justice model of 
counterterrorism.  Finally, through the case study of the United States, this research generates a 
dialogue between IR literature and literature on American public law and public policy, which is 
crucial to understanding the limits and boundaries of both types of counterterrorism strategies.     
 This work is concerned with developing fully theorized models of counterterrorism 
practices, specifically criminal justice and military strategies, and understanding not only how 
and when they are employed, but also their relationship to the phenomenon of terrorism.  This 
work is also concerned with differentiating the two strategic models and understanding how they 
affect closely related political and social phenomena such as government spending, public 
opinion, and the civil-criminal process.   
To this end several hypotheses about the nature of the counterterrorism responses and 
their relationship to terrorism are tested using evidence from the United States spanning from 
1971-2014.  There is an understanding that the criminal justice model of counterterrorism seeks 
to preserve democratic principles, such as rule of law and civil liberties, and therefore yields less 
violations of these principles when compared to the military model.  In the context of the United 
States, criminal justice approaches to terrorism are thought to have been used predominantly 
before 9/11, while military action, detention, and tribunal came after these attacks.  Post-9/11 




severe tactics of a military response are a better deterrent of terrorism.  Post-9/11 terrorism not 
only directly evokes a military response, but incites the public to rally around military action as 
well.   
These hypotheses connecting terrorism, military activity, and public opinion and 
connecting terrorism and criminal justice measures are investigated through quantitative and 
qualitative analysis.  I use vector autoregression, a variant of multiple time series, to investigate 
the relationship between terrorism and the military activity and also to expose any temporal 
anomalies, for example the proposed paradigm shift from the criminal justice model to the 
military model after 9/11.  In addition, the quantitative analysis examines the role of public 
opinion in military responses to terrorism.  Qualitative analysis is performed to investigate those 
questions that cannot be answered with data or due to a lack of data; predominantly questions 
related to the criminal justice model and questions that deal with how and under what conditions 
the different models are employed.   
Using the U.S. as my case study, I make several recurrent arguments throughout the text.  
Namely, that the two counterterrorism models are often used concurrently and sometimes 
interchangeably over time rather than explicitly before and after 9/11, that terrorism has direct 
impacts on the public and the military, that counterterrorism responses do not always abide by 
the democratic principles they claim to protect, and finally, that the counterterrorism models do 
not treat all suspected terrorists equally.  The overarching theme to these arguments is that when 
terrorism occurs, the government nearly always responds, but may not always do so consistently.  
The quantitative research empirically demonstrates that the government responds and the 




 The question of the origins and definitions of terrorism and counterterrorism are not 
easily answered nor analyzed.  Chapter 1 defines terrorism for the purposes of this research, 
separating out domestic from transnational and even from state sponsored.  It explains the goals 
and strategies of modern terrorism and presents foundations for combatting and preventing 
terrorism, while paying special attention to the roles of the military and of the criminal justice 
system.  Specifically, this chapter presents the limited research on the criminal justice and 
military models of counterterrorism, how they have previously been conceptualized, and how 
they have been thought to relate to counterterrorism practice. 
Chapter 2 begins with a quick introduction to early U.S. experiences with terrorism and 
proceeds to discuss in detail the system of U.S. counterterrorism practice for the last half century.  
It explores these practices in the context of the criminal justice and military models of 
counterterrorism and highlights several inconsistencies between the conceptual literature and the 
history of counterterrorism practice in the U.S.  
 The criminal justice and military models are fully theorized in chapter 3.  I begin with a 
brief discussion of the theory building process; what theory is and its relevant components, how 
it is constructed, and how it is used.  This chapter takes the conceptualizations of the criminal 
justice and military models of counterterrorism and theorizes them for the purpose of hypothesis 
testing.  It lays out the axioms and assumptions contained in each model, which leads to the 
presentation of several preliminary hypotheses about each.  These hypotheses do not just make 
claims about phenomena within or related to each respective model, but also suggest associations 
between the two models.   
 These hypotheses are tested in the next two chapters.  Chapter 4 presents the research 




analytical tools: granger causality, impulse response function, and forecast error variance 
decomposition.  It explains the method’s applicability to this research and considers it relevance 
over other frequently used models such as standard time series or autodistributed lag models.  
There is a thorough explanation of the data sources and coding decisions made for each of the 
variables.  The chapter ends with the presentation of the quantitative results and a discussion of 
their implications.   
 Chapter 5 introduces the qualitative analysis.  A combination of historical, content, and 
discourse analysis were used to investigate the practices of the government with regard to 
criminal-legal and military responses to terrorism.  The methodology is meticulously detailed, 
providing relevant terms of analysis, their conceptualizations and definitions, along with all 
coding schemes.  The results are presented on their own terms and in relation to the quantitative 
findings presented in Chapter 4.  The qualitative research explores how, why, and under what 
conditions the different models of counterterrorism are used.   
 Finally, the conclusion of the dissertation discusses the implications of the empirical 
findings in totality; both quantitative and qualitative.  It highlights the relevance and importance 
of this dissertation to counterterrorism policy as well as its contribution to the International 
Relations and counterterrorism literature.  It evaluates the research, what it is able to accomplish 
and what questions are still unanswered, and points out the limitations to the study.  It concludes 






Chapter 1: Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Arriving at Conceptual Definitions 
 
 The threat of terrorism, both domestic and transnational, has grown throughout the last 
half century.  Academics and practitioners of counterterrorism have yet to agree on a conceptual 
understanding of terrorism, its causes, and motives, let alone a best practice strategy to combat it.  
This chapter lays out the existing literature on terrorism and counterterrorism in attempt to 
generate a synthesis between theory and practice with the intent of producing an operational 
understanding of terrorism and the criminal justice and military strategies that governments 
employ to combat it.    
Terrorism 
The international community, broadly speaking, has long struggled to settle on a singular 
definition of terrorism.  While most agencies, organizations, and scholars agree that terrorism is 
meant to incite fear and anxiety into an audience beyond that of the immediate victims, there is 
little consensus about the motivations of terrorist violence as political, religious, social or some 
combination of the three, whether the targets are necessarily civilian non-combatants or can 
include military targets as well, and whether the perpetrators can be state actors (or act on behalf 
of a state) or must be non-state actors.
1
   
Some international organizations such as the UN have yet to come to a consensus on a 
definition of terrorism.  The UN fears that defining such an act may come with the risk of 
religious and ethnic profiling that may consequentially incite more individuals to fall prey to 
                                                 
1
 Growing concerns of cyber-terrorism and cyber-warfare have pushed for a re-examination of the definition of 
terrorism and the nature of the threat that it imposes.  In 1991, the National Academy of Sciences reported that 
“tomorrow’s terrorist may be able to do more damage with a keyboard than with a bomb,” drawing attention to the 
magnitude of damage that one cyber-attack could accomplish.  That cyber-terrorism has moved to the forefront of 
national security consideration necessarily requires that governments become more flexible in the way that they 






  The World Trade Organization, despite its many anti-terrorism 
financing task forces, relies on a third party, RAND National Security Research Division, to set 
its operational definition of terrorism as it does not have a doctrine of its own conceptually 
outlining terrorism.
3
  The actions of the International Committee of the Red Cross are 
predominantly guided by International Humanitarian Law (IHL), which does not provide a 
concrete definition of terrorism; however, the Red Cross notes that many acts that would be 
associated with terrorism would be prohibited by IHL if committed in peace time.
4
 
Since there is no international consensus with regard to what counts as terrorism, states 
rely on conceptualizations and definitions of terrorism from domestic organizations and 
institutions.  However, definitions of terrorism also vary domestically.  The U.S. Department of 
State, for example, defines terrorism as “premeditated, politically motivated violence against 
noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence 
an audience.” The U.S. Department of Defense defines terrorism as “[t]he unlawful use, or 
threatened use, of force or violence against individuals or property to coerce and intimidate 
governments or societies, often to achieve political, religious, or ideological objectives.”  The 
two definitions do not agree on several aspects.  First, they disagree on whether the motivation of 
terrorism is explicitly political or a combination of political, religious, and ideological motives.  
Second, they disagree on the qualification of victims: non-combatants versus any individual or 
even property.  Finally, they disagree on the type of perpetrator; the State Department identifies 
non-state actors in its definition, while the Department of Defense does not specify any type of 
                                                 
2
 This information is taken from the UN General Assembly Sixth Committee 4
th
 Meeting (AM) on October 7, 2005.  
The press release for this meeting and partial transcripts are titled “Agreed definition for the term ‘terrorism’ said to 
be needed for consensus on completing comprehensive convention against it,’ and can be read in full at 
https://www.un.org/press/en/2005/gal3276.doc.htm.    
3
 This fact is evidenced by the World Trade Organization Annual Reports, which rely on RAND terrorism data to 
explore the links between terrorism, terrorist financing, subsidies, trade, and other economic variables.   
4
 This information was taken from the International Committee for the Red Cross’ 2011 FAQ about IHL and 




perpetrator.  In addition, none of the definitions seem to identify the difference between domestic 
and transnational terrorism other than borders, even though theory suggests the root causes, 
motivations, and perpetrators may be different.   
Outside of practice, definitions of terrorism vary across academic fields, and even within 
academic subfields.  Criminology, for example, declares defining terrorism a “sticky activity” 
because what separates terrorism from ordinary crime is motivation, which is often unobservable 
(Mythen and Walklate 2005).  While criminologists generally agree that terrorism is the use of 
violence to intimidate civilians and coerce a government or identifiable community into religious 
or political change, they seem to disagree about the types of actors involved, the types of 
intended targets, and the major causes and other possible motivations (Agnew 2010).  
Sociological literature writes that defining terrorism is “highly controversial for reasons other 
than conceptual issues and problems,” but rather because of the unintended consequences that 
definitions may have, such as condemnation of individuals and cultivation of ideological and 
political bias (Gibbs 1989).  Some sociologists have defined terrorism as a form of social control 
in which organized civilians covertly inflict mass violence on other civilians as a form of 
“unilateral self-help (Black 2002; Deflem 2004, Turk 2004).”  
In political science, and more specifically, in the International Relations (IR) subfield, 
terrorism is generally characterized by violence against civilians with the intent to intimidate a 
larger audience in order to realize a political or ideological goal.  However, some IR scholars 
argue that terrorists use political violence to acquire support through intimidation and fear 
(Crenshaw 1981, Rapoport 1984, Jackson 2009), or that they use violence to elicit an 
asymmetrical response from the government in order to garner a more legitimate form of support 




scholars are unresolved on the purpose of terrorism with some citing that terrorism often lacks 
clear and identifiable goals (see Lake 2002, Abrahms 2008), while others believe terrorism to be 
the product of rational actors seeking to maximize utility on a clearly defined goal (Hoffman 
1999, Pape 2005).   
Despite the variations across theory and practice, there are some commonalities across 
the definitions of terrorism.  First, the violence, whether or actual or intended, is premeditated, 
resulting from some kind of planning rather than impulse.  Second, motivations for terrorism, 
though vast, do not necessarily include personal gain at the aggregate level.
5
  Third, terrorism is 
intended to have a lasting impact beyond the immediate attack and these impacts can range from 
social and psychological to financial and political.  Fourth, terrorism sets it aim on unarmed 
individuals and property, which can include civilians as well as military personnel not engaged 
in armed combat.  Finally, terrorism is defined as such when it is carried out by clandestine 
agents, such as non-state or subnational groups or covert organizations acting on behalf of a state 
or state actor.   
For the purposes of this study, terrorism is defined as the premeditated or threatened use 
of violence by an individual or group to obtain a political or ideological objective through 
intimidating or inciting fear in a larger audience beyond the immediate victims.  This definition 
leaves open several possibilities.  First, the goals of the terrorists may be political or ideological.  
This reflects the more recent trend in the fourth wave of terrorism to promote religious, 
nationalist, and other ideological ideals.  Second, it makes no claim about whom or what the 
immediate victim must be, allowing the targets of terrorist attacks to be either people or property.  
                                                 
5
 I add at the aggregate level here, because some research may suggest that some individuals participating in 




Finally, it is vague about the affiliations of the perpetrator, making no mention of the necessity 
for subnational actors, allowing for the possibility of state and state sponsored terrorism.   
 In scholarship and policy, terrorism is often classified into two categories: domestic and 
transnational.  Domestic terrorism, also known as homegrown terrorism, occurs when the venue, 
target, and perpetrators are all from the same country.  The USA Patriot Act (Section 802) 
declares that an act is considered domestic terrorism if it occurs primarily on U.S. territory, is 
“dangerous to human life” and is intended to “intimidate or coerce a civilian population, 
influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion, or affect the conduct of 
government by mass destruction, assassination or kidnapping.”  Other definitions of domestic 
terrorism suggest it to be violence against civilian populations by a citizen of the target nation 
with the intent to influence national policy (see for example RAND Corporation and 
EUROPOL).
6
  Domestic terrorism is almost always political or ideological in nature and is 
aimed at influencing the political environment either in regard to policy or to changes in the 
treatment of specific groups (Ross and Gurr 1989).  Though recent years have brought forward a 
strategy focused predominantly on combatting international terrorist threats, domestic terrorism 
has caused nearly twice as many deaths than transnational terrorism since 1970 and more than 
twice as many deaths in the U.S. since the attacks on September 11.
7
   
 Terrorism is transnational when “an incident in one country involves victims, targets, 
institutions, governments, or citizens of another country (Sandler and Enders 2004).”  For 
example, the FBI, through US Code 18, section 2331, defines international or transnational 
terrorism by three characteristics, similar to those set forth in the definition of domestic 
                                                 
6
 RAND http://www.rand.org/topics/domestic-terrorism.html  
EUROPOL https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/europol_tesat_2016.pdf  
7
 This information was harvested from the Global Terrorism Database using the int_any variable.  For calculation of 




terrorism.  First, it must involve acts that are dangerous to human life that violate federal or state 
law.  Second, the act(s) must be intended to coerce a civilian population, influence the policy of 
the government through intimidation or coercion, and affect the conduct of the government by 
mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping.  Finally, the act(s) must occur primarily outside 
of the territorial jurisdiction of the state or transcend national boundaries either in the locale of 
the target, the citizenship of the intended victims, the origins of the perpetrator, or the locale in 
which they operate or seek asylum, or the means by which they are accomplished.
8
  Though 
considerably less deadly than domestic terrorism over time, transnational terrorism has occupied 
a major security priority for the better part of the last half-century.  With the initial increase in 
transnational attacks in the 1970s and second and third waves in the 90s and 2000s, the media 
and public have appealed to policy makers worldwide to prioritize the eradication of 
transnational terrorist acts and organizations, including state sponsored terrorism in Libya, Iran, 
and Iraq among others, culminating in the U.S.-led Coalition of the Willing to end Saddam 
Hussein’s support for state sponsored terrorism.   
Some studies further impugn states with terrorist activity, adding another category of 
terrorism, namely, state sponsored. States sometimes permit the operations of terrorist groups 
within their border, and even request that these actors perform terrorist acts on the state’s behalf 
in order to achieve some political goal important to the state.  Usually, states will sponsor 
terrorism when they are dealing with problems of intra- or interstate conflict, have moderately 
weak rule of law and political institutions, but have demonstrated coercive bargaining 
capabilities.  Often the relationship between the state and its sponsored group backfires when the 
                                                 
8





demands of the groups are not adequately met; therefore states that sponsor terrorism are also 
more likely to experience domestic terror (Bapat 2012).  
Throughout history, and particularly in the last half century, the world has seen an 
increasing number of sovereign states sponsoring terrorism in many different ways.  Some states 
provide financial or material support to terrorist organization offering not only money, but 
weapons, equipment, and facilities.  In addition, states may offer amnesty and political asylum to 
terrorist groups from other states seeking to apprehend terrorists (Banks et al., 2008).  States may 
also passively support terrorism by turning a blind eye to terrorist operations within their 
borders.  States such as South Africa, Libya, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and others have been suspected 
to sponsor terrorist groups both within and outside of their borders.   
As investigative capabilities have become stronger, active support of terrorism by states 
has declined, while passive support of terrorism by states has increased.  Today, the cost of overt 
state sponsorship of terrorism is too high and the groups themselves benefit less as direct cash 
infusions, unenforced borders, and active state participation in recruiting and operations make 
the groups more visible and vulnerable.  However, passive support of terrorism still allows for 
the state to claim plausible deniability and even inability to effectively combat terror groups.  
 While state sponsored terrorist organizations may require different empirical 
considerations than non-state groups, governments tend to view both in a similar conceptual 
vein, with one caveat: states that sponsor terrorism can be retaliated against (legally) by the 
norms and conventions of the international system and international law.  That said, the terrorism 
literature lacks systematic explorations of the characterizations of terrorist groups that seek state 
sponsorship versus those that do not.  Until these studies exist and for the purposes of this study, 




state and sub-national actors.  The definition of terrorism used in this research allows for the 
empirical investigation of transnational terrorism and transnational state sponsored terrorism, but 
does not include measures of domestic terrorism, as this type of terrorism more readily includes 
the influence of subnational level indicators that vary from state to state.
9
 
Though scholars and counterterrorism actors have yet to come to a consensus on the 
definitions of transnational and domestic terrorism, they have already begun chronicling the 
evolution of terrorist events through waves in history.  Criminological and political science 
literature differ somewhat about the chronology of the so-called “waves of terrorism”.  In 
criminology, modern terrorism dates back to the political hostage taking and plane hijackings of 
the 1960s (LaFree 2010), but political scientist David Rapoport (2004) suggests that modern 
terrorism began in the 1880s with anarchist turbulence in Russia.  Regardless of either time of 
origin, modern terrorism has evolved as policies and technology have changed over time.  First, 
terrorism has become more transnational and less confined by borders.  While domestic terrorism 
is still the most prevalent form of terrorism, transnational terrorism began to increase in the late 
1960s, including the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) air hijacking of an El 
Al flight from Rome to Tel Aviv, and, for the U.S., the hijacking of El AL flight 253 from Tel 
Aviv to New York City.   
Second, targets of terrorist attacks have become more political.  In 1984, the Provisional 
Irish Republican Army (PIRA) bombed the Brighton Hotel, killing four U.K. government 
officials and injuring dozens more.  In the U.S., in 1969, the Department of Commerce, the Air 
Forces Induction Center, and the Federal Building of New York City were bombed, not to 
                                                 
9
 This is not to say that empirical investigations of transnational terrorism do not consider national level predictors, 
rather suggests that the predictors of transnational terrorism, as exist in current literature, are generally constant from 
state to state (for example GDP, regime type, international militarized conflict).  On the other hand, predictors of 
domestic terrorism might include different subnational predictors that are specific to the conditions and environment 




mention the U.S. embassy bombings that would take place in the 70s, 80s and 90s.  While 
radicalization can be traced back at least as far as Russia in the late 1800s, a more recent wave, 
in the late 1980s, of political and religious radicalization has threatened modern political systems 
and ways of life (McCauley and Moskalenko 2008).   
Third, and especially as of late, terrorists have learned how to effectively exploit the 
media and garner attention to their advantage.  Media outlets have become central to the 
strategies of terrorist groups and media coverage is considered an important calculation during 
the initial stages of planning an attack (Schmid and de Graaf 1982, Alexander and Latter 1990, 
Nacos 1994, Wilkinson 1997).  Research in sociology, criminology, and even the margins of 
political science have suggested that terrorism is better understood as a form of communication, 
rather than solely as political violence (Crelinsten 2002, Nacos 2003, Fernandez 2009).  Terrorist 
groups not only employ strategies that target media exposure and public recognition in 
advancement of their goals, but have also moved to social media for recruitment and retention 
efforts (Conway 2017).   
An argument may be made that terrorism has evolved in a way that in effect requires 
governments to respond with certain types of strategies.  For example, terrorist groups have 
greater access to biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons, technology both for recruitment and 
weapons capabilities, and political access, including governmental influence and coercion 
(Laqueur 1996, Jackson 2001).  Terrorism groups have also demonstrated greater resolve to 
carry out attacks against their targets.
10
  As terrorist groups gain greater access and capabilities, 
especially in the area of weapons and military style training and tactics, some scholars and 
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practitioners believe that states have no choice other than to respond to these groups with equal, 
if not great, displays of capabilities and force (Merari 1993, Rumsfeld 2002).
11
 
Although terrorist activity has changed over time and has evolved to greater resolve and 
capabilities, the primary strategies employed to combat it have stayed the same.  Whether in the 
late nineteenth century or in the early 1960s, government responses to terrorism remained 
relatively static and somewhat lackluster, at least until the attacks of 9/11 (Alexander 2002).  
Thus far, government counterterrorism responses can be largely confined to two major 
approaches: criminal justice and military.   
Counterterrorism 
Counterterrorism may be loosely defined as “a mix of public and foreign policies 
designed to limit the actions of terrorist groups and individuals associated with terrorist 
organizations in an attempt to protect the general public from terrorist violence (Omelicheva 
2010).”  Actions of counterterrorism policies may include everything from criminal legal 
prosecution, sanctions and suspension of financial transactions involving terrorist groups and 
their sponsors, law enforcement operations, intelligence collection, military commissions, and 
diplomacy among others.   
Combatting terrorism may not only rely on counterterrorism methods, but may include 
other government response tactics such as counterinsurgency methods and foreign internal 
defense.  Like counterterrorism, counterinsurgency uses comprehensive civilian and military 
strategies but does so in order to combat and contain political struggles of individuals or groups 
looking to gain some kind of territorial control (Nagl et al., 2008).  Foreign internal defense 
denotes joint, interagency, and international efforts to combat insurgency (Millen and Metz 
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2004).  Together, counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and foreign internal defense complete a 
repertoire of government response strategies in the face of insurgent or terrorist threat.  Often, 
these camps overlap and in practice the arsenal of counterterrorism tools includes 
counterinsurgency and foreign internal defense methods.  Therefore, for the purposes of this 
dissertation these government response strategies should be considered to fall under the umbrella 
of counterterrorism. 
One way that IR scholars discuss the classification of counterterrorism strategy is to think 
of them in terms of proactive and reactive strategy.  Proactive counterterrorism strategy helps 
governments to get in front of an attack, stopping it before it happens.  Some actions associated 
with proactive counterterrorism might include destroying terrorist training camps, infiltrating 
terrorist networks, gathering intelligence, targeting terrorist financial assets and state sponsors, 
and criminalization of membership in terrorist organizations (Arce M. and Sandler 2005, 
Crelinsten 2014).  Proactive strategy is effectively preemptive counterterrorism as it involves 
attacking terrorists and their assets in order to prevent, rather than in response to, an attack.   
Reactive, or defensive, counterterrorism strategy, on the other hand, often comes in 
response to a terrorist event.  Some defensive actions might include strengthening security of 
possible future targets, securing borders, instilling metal detectors and bomb detection equipment 
in public spaces, creating stronger firewalls and tech barriers, and retaliation against perpetrators 
and their sponsors more broadly (Behm and Palmer 1991, Ragazzi 2014).  These reactive 
strategies are meant to deter future attacks by lowering the probability of success for the 
perpetrator or by making the severity of negative consequences higher (Arce M. and Sandler 




Because of the nature of counterterrorism decision making, it may be thought of in terms 
of a game theoretic model where costs and benefits are calculated and tradeoffs and payoffs are 
considered (Arce M. and Sandler 2005).  Counterterrorism may also be thought of as a strategic 
bargaining game between governments and terrorist groups where payoff structures are 
determined by the costs of action/inaction, costs of bargaining, and subsequent concessions from 
either side (Atkinson, Sandler, and Tschirhart 1987, Lake 2002, Sandler 2003, Bapat 2006, 
Crenshaw 2007).  
When selecting counterterrorism strategies, states must make tradeoffs between investing 
in the success of counterterrorism over investing in other domestic policies.  The policy tradeoff 
comes with the bonus of bolstered security, but often at the expense of governmental 
transparency and of the provision of other public goods such as infrastructure (Bueno de 
Mesquita 2005, Shapiro and Siegel 2010).  In addition, some scholars concerned with human 
rights implications of counterterrorism policy argue that a tradeoff occurs when certain policies 
are enacted and civil liberties are subsequently curbed (Comey 2005, Dragu 2011).  States must 
consider these tradeoffs, among other things, when constructing a comprehensive 
counterterrorism strategy.  While they may elect to employ both preemptive and deterrent 
strategies at the same time, yet another tradeoff, due to financial costs and personnel and 
equipment requirements, occurs between the two, with deterrence most often coming out on top.      
States must also grapple with the security tradeoffs that occur when engaging with and 
especially when affording concessions to terrorist groups.  Since the interaction between states 
and terrorist organizations is strategic, governments must be careful of externalities associated 
with “more accommodative actions” such as sympathizing with terrorist support bases in order to 




general concessions regarding assets, operations, and terrorists’ political goals (Siquiera and 
Sandler 2006; Rosendorff and Sandler 2005, Kydd and Walter 2006).  Concessions are 
particularly common in incidences of suicide terrorism, which Robert Pape (2003) writes “has 
probably encouraged more terrorist groups to pursue even more ambitious” campaigns.     
Certain conceptualizations of counterterrorism approaches seek to compile related 
counterterrorism tools, actions, and responses as means of providing effective strategy for 
combatting terrorism, while minimizing certain tradeoffs and maximizing the intended outcomes.  
Two such approaches are classified as the criminal justice model and the military model.  As 
suggested by their names, the criminal justice model of counterterrorism employs a 
predominantly deterrent criminal-legal strategy to combatting terrorism seeking to minimize the 
tradeoff between security and liberty, while the military model emphasizes preemptive and 
deterrent physical prowess and the use of force to maximize the security outcome while 
minimizing the bargaining leverage and capacity of the terrorist organization (Bhoumik 2004, 
Bapat 2011).   
In the criminal justice model, police and investigative agencies carry out the primary 
responsibility of bringing alleged terrorists to justice, with the additional intent of deterring 
future terrorism.  Other players in the criminal justice model include law makers, the courts, 
justices, and prisons, which all play a crucial role in designing legal framework and following 
through on the prosecution, detention, and conviction of suspected terrorists.  The main argument 
of this model is that a comprehensive anti- and counterterrorism strategy should rely 
predominantly on the respect and integrity of democracy and the scope and prescriptions of the 




 The criminal justice model views terrorism as a crime.  In the criminology literature, 
terrorism is often studied through the lens of general or structural strain theory, which posits that 
grievances with social realities, such as material deprivation, problems associated with 
globalization, ethnic and religious conflict and oppression, and other socio-economic problems, 
are the major causes of the crimes that we associate as falling under the umbrella of terrorism 
(Agnew 2010).  In this understanding, terrorism, as defined, consists of serious infractions, such 
as murder, bodily harm, kidnapping, and other violent crimes in order to inflict harm on a 
civilian audience to achieve a political or ideological goal (Miller 2009).  In this regard, the 
important distinction between terrorist crimes and other criminal acts is motivation.   
While the international relations and legal literature depart from the general strain theory 
of criminology, they do admit that criminal justice models of counterterrorism work under the 
assumption that terrorism is a crime which aims to threaten public safety.  In all three literatures, 
criminal justice agents pursue and prosecute criminals suspected of terrorism through law 
enforcement measures and punish only those found guilty of committing a crime (Crelinsten 
2002).  Crimes associated with terrorism violate the laws of the state within state jurisdiction, 
against that states’ citizens, directed at the states’ national security, or are “intended to have 
substantial effects within its borders (even if taken outside the borders; Feldman 2002).”  
Because the state must act within its jurisdiction through its own legal system, the state 
exercises extreme restraint with regard to its monopoly on violence, instead employing criminal-
legal strategies to deter, detain, punish, and provide retribution in the wake of a terrorist event.  
The state is bound by domestic legal institutions and, especially in the case of democracies, rule 
of law that restrict its ability to use violence against perpetrators and only allow punishment of 




justice model of counterterrorism, states seek to uphold individual rights and civil liberties and 
preserve all democratic principles and institutions. 
Since the criminal justice model views terrorism as a crime, or series of crimes, this 
counterterrorism approach necessarily rests on the assumption that criminal punishment can be a 
deterrent for future terrorism.  Actions in the criminal justice toolkit such as detention, criminal 
trial, and prison are set for the purposes of condemnations of criminal terrorist actions, but are 
hopefully severe enough to “deter future bad conduct (Chesney and Goldsmith 2008).”   In 
addition, the intelligence gathering processes of the criminal justice model work to identify 
dangerous terrorist operatives and bring them to trial signaling to the existing terrorist groups 
both a drop in probability of success of future attacks and an increase in the likelihood of 
negative consequences for carrying out an attack (Crelinsten 1998).   
Many have questioned the effectiveness of the criminal justice model at deterring future 
terrorism, citing that some terrorists are not deterred by punishment (Chesney and Goldmsith 
2008, Kroenig and Pavel 2012).  Others worry about the inability of the court systems to 
properly serve justice, especially in states where governments are less accountable to their 
citizens (Steven and Gunaratna 2004).  This has led some states, and scholars, to be more 
inclined toward the more severe, yet somewhat less structured approach of the military model of 
counterterrorism, especially in the post-9/11 context.   
The use of military force to respond to terrorism has, in conventional wisdom, been 
viewed as a last resort strategy, or, at the very least, as secondary to criminal-legal strategies.  
Liberal state responses to terrorism must be “well-defined and controlled,” and should exhaust 




However, the bureaucratic obstacles of the criminal legal system create severe challenges, such 
as those mentioned in the previous section, to the prevention and deterrence of terrorism. 
Where the criminal justice model focuses on protection of civil liberties and individual 
rights as embodied by the rule of law, the military model focuses on security and protection of 
the state and its citizens as embodied in the rules of war (Crelinsten 1989b).  The military model, 
also called the war model, is conceptually applied when terrorism concerns are persistent, great 
in magnitude, and/or imminent and has the purpose of suppressing and eliminating the enemy, 
specifically terrorist groups and threats (Chesney 2006, Murphy 2009).  The main objective of 
this approach to counterterrorism is to infiltrate and incapacitate enemy groups, terrorists, by 
employing military tactics up to and including maximal force.  From this view, terrorism takes 
on a strategic dimension, where it is no longer a crime but an act of war and a threat to national 
security.    
Contrary to the criminal justice model, the military model of counterterrorism encourages 
states to exercise its monopoly on violence in order to effectively eradicate terrorists and subvert 
their political goals (Crelinsten 2002).  States must be careful to maintain legitimacy in their 
choice to use violence against terrorist perpetrators by staying as close as possible to the confines 
of democratic principles such as civil and constitutional rights and rule of law.  The military 
model allows for some flexibility in states’ capacities to pursue, detain, and punish terrorists 
even if these strategies fall just outside of conventional civil-criminal expectations and 
procedures (Neuman 2004).    
Democratic states must be particularly mindful of audience costs associated with 
employing the military model.  Public opinion is significantly affected by terrorist incidents, 




demands of their citizens, employing military strategy for security gains, but must be mindful of 
the negative public consequences that may follow if the state violates the public’s expectations of 
appropriateness in counterterrorism strategy.  Most concerning for the state is striking a balance 
between the public perception of security and its perception of the preservations of human rights 
and liberties (Kielsgard 2005).   
One way the state helps guide public perception of a military counterterrorism approach 
is through its framing of terrorism and terrorists.  The military model of counterterrorism views 
terrorism as an act of war and terrorists as combatant enemies.  This makes combatting terrorism 
through this framework particularly complex because wars are generally fought between states, 
while terrorist organizations usually represent subnational or non-state actors.  By identifying the 
opposition as “illegal enemy combatants,” the military model attempts to create a tangential 
category of and to legitimize action against opponents who “use stealth and do not wear 
uniforms or insignia” and orchestrate events that call for an unequivocal “doctrine of military 
necessity (Crelinsten 2014; Roth 2004).”  Essentially, by identifying terrorists as enemy 
combatants, the military model generates an obligation to act in the name of a desperate 
humanitarian cause. 
 The doctrine of military necessity comes from international humanitarian law (IHL) and 
is fundamental to the legitimization of aggressive and violent state action including warfare.  
Recall that the criminal justice model sets its foundation in adherence to IHL, however, the 
military model of counterterrorism has not always looked to IHL for guidance in executing its 
strategies and operations.  Ronald Crelinsten (2009) writes,  
“International humanitarian law, including the Geneva Conventions, was 
not usually a part of the discourse since a war model of counterterrorism 
was not the norm.  When international humanitarian law was discussed, it 




counterterrorism.  Since 9/11, international humanitarian law has come 
under increasing scrutiny as critics of the “War on Terror” attempt to 
develop a legal framework for a primarily military approach to 
counterterrorism.”   
 
Unlike the criminal justice model, which stresses the importance of upholding democratic and 
humanitarian principles above all else, the military model emphasizes the importance of 
devastating and eradicating terrorism, and is willing to bend, reconstitute, and even forgo the rule 
of law to do so (Taft 2003).   
 As does the criminal justice model, the military model has its limitations and 
deficiencies, the first being potential effectiveness.  Many human rights groups as well as law 
enforcement actors doubt the ability of military operations and war to effectively combat 
terrorism citing that counterterrorism should be carried out through criminal justice actors and 
domestic preparedness programs (Crenshaw 2001).  At the same time, some scholars have 
argued that one of the goals of terrorism is to provoke the state into using asymmetric military 
force to gain sympathy for their cause and effectively counteracting the strategy’s effectiveness 
at incapacitating terrorist groups (Collins 2004, Duyvesteyn 2008).  
In addition to the criminal justice and military models, there are other ways to 
conceptualize state responses to terrorism.  Yonah Alexander (2002), for example, writes that 
there are seven basic pillars of counterterrorism policy.  Although those are written for the US, 
they are broadly applicable for most democratic states and have been loosely applied in academic 
research to states in Western Europe, Israel, and India (see Bhoumik 2004, van Dongen 2010, De 
Graaf 2011.  The first pillar encourages rule of law to prosecute terrorist suspects and to 
criminalize all acts associated with terrorism; this includes a strengthening of domestic 
antiterrorism laws.  The second pillar affirms a non-concessions policy, stating that the ascension 




Security Decision Directive No. 207, 1986).  The third pillar emphasizes the importance of 
intelligence collection in the detection, deterrence, prevention and apprehension of terrorists and 
encourages coordinated efforts among law enforcement agencies worldwide.  Diplomacy efforts 
make up the fourth pillar as it encourages international cooperation and the implementation of 
common anti- and counterterrorism policies.  The fifth pillar sets countermeasures and penalties, 
such as sanctions and legal prohibitions, for the sponsorship of terrorism, including state 
sponsorship.  The sixth pillar affords the financial, physical, and technical security necessary to 
combat terrorism and prevent future attacks.  Finally, the seventh pillar commits to coordination 
and collective measures among agencies and organizations that are responsible for 
counterterrorism measures. 
This conceptualization, however, is compatible with the criminal justice and military 
typology.  For example, the most visible of the pillars are pillars one and six, criminal-legal 
sanctions and physical security measures.  Criminological and legal theory suggests that the 
deterrence of terrorism may be best accomplished by establishing a comprehensive set of 
criminal prohibitions, yet historical evidence suggests that terrorists are not deterred by criminal 
sanctions and prosecutions (Dickinson 2002, LaFree and Hendrickson 2007).   
Governments may alternatively or simultaneously choose to combat terrorism through 
use of military force, pillar six; the line of thought being that most Western nations, especially 
the United States, have more extensive military capability than any terrorist organization.  The 
purpose of a military response is more about the restraint of terrorism than the preservation of 
rule of law and liberal democracy, as is the case with criminal-legal responses (Pedahzur and 
Ranstorp 2001). However, historical experience has shown that military force is only sometimes 




responses to terrorism comes with great considerations and externalities that include 
consideration of humanitarian and international law, injury and loss of lives, massive financial 
burden and property damage, and infringement of state sovereignty.  Just as in the criminal-
military typology, Yonah’s pillars imply a relationship between the type of response and the 
outcome in terms of deterrence or preemption of terrorism but does not fully theorize or test it. 
Conclusions 
 Agreeing to an acting definition of terrorism is important for constructing the guidelines 
which not only help to identify terrorist acts and organizations but also help to understand which 
strategies might best combat it.  If terrorism is defined as the premeditated or threatened use of 
violence by an individual or group to obtain a political or ideological objective through 
intimidating or inciting fear in a larger audience beyond the immediate victims, then statesmust 
consider what types of strategies, especially in the criminal-legal and physical force or military 
frameworks, would work best to not only prevent or deter future terrorism, but also to reshape 
political and ideological grievances that may lead to extranormal violence in the first place.  The 
next chapter presents these models of counterterrorism in the context of history, policy, and 






Chapter 2: U.S. Counterterrorism Responses 
Historians trace U.S. early experiences with terrorism to September 6, 1901, when 
President William McKinley was assassinated by Leon Czolgosz.  This display of first-wave 
anarchist terror represented one of the first domestic terrorism incidences in the U.S. and led to 
President Roosevelt’s call for a “worldwide crusade to exterminate terrorism everywhere 
(Rapoport 2002; Thornton 2006).”  One of the first major transnational terrorism attacks against 
the U.S. was recorded in New York City on Wall Street in 1920, when a horse drawn cart set off 
a bomb killing more than 30 people, injuring several hundreds more, and causing over $24 
million in damage (Barron 2003).    
Despite these early incidences, terrorism events before the 1970s were too infrequent and 
too low in magnitude to be considered a major threat to national security (Omelicheva 2010).  
However, moving into the 1980s, terrorism against the United States had become increasingly 
international with nearly 140 transnational attacks including a series of bombings targeting the 
U.S. Embassy, its annex, and Marine barracks in Beirut, the U.S. Embassy in Kuwait, the Rome 
and Vienna Airports, and a popular discotheque in Berlin.  These events signified a new era of 
frequent terrorist attacks against U.S. national interests with greater property damage, injuries, 
and causalities. This wave of terrorist incidents forced the government to take more intense and 
resolute response strategies, such as economic sanctions and military force, up to and including 
conventional warfare (Smith and Thomas 2001).  It also highlighted the need for a 
comprehensive counterterrorism strategy that would employ all of Yonah’s pillars, a strategy that 
would not be reached until after 9/11 when the dimension of the perception of terrorist threat 






Criminal Justice Responses to Terrorism in the U.S.  
 One of the first major attempts at criminalizing terrorism came with the Alien and 
Sedition Acts of 1798 (Martin 1996).  The Sedition Acts had an intention securing America from 
immigrants deemed “dangerous to peace and safety,” for which the consequences were 
imprisonment and deportation.  Though these acts did not mention ‘terrorism’ explicitly, 
requirements of individuals to “register aliens,” and to “restrain, secure, and remove” citizens of 
“hostile nations or governments,” as well as the outlawing of the act of or conspiring to direct 
opposition at “any measure of the government of the United States” and making false statements 
against the government, implies some preoccupation with terrorism, at least conceptually.
12
 
Since then, and often coinciding with the declaration of war, there has been additional 
legislation outlawing acts associated with terrorism, including the Espionage Act in 1917 (18 
U.S. Code Chapter 37), which outlawed conspiracy, interference with foreign commerce, and 
counterfeiting, and established the criteria for obtaining a search warrant, and the Biological 
Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989 (especially 18 U.S. Code 175) which defined biological 
warfare and afforded criminal penalties for buying, selling, and manufacturing any biological 
agents for use as weapons.
13
 
However, these pieces of legislation neither defined the crime of terrorism explicitly, nor 
set standards for the actions of counterterrorism actors or punishments for perpetrators.  That 
changed in the 1970s-1980s when the U.S., moved by a series of assassinations, air-jackings, 
kidnappings, hostage takings, and bombings directed at the U.S. interests and citizens abroad, 
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approved several pieces of legislation which criminalized terrorism and set guidelines by which 
counterterrorism actors could investigate, detain, and punish terrorist suspects.  These policies, 
expanded upon below, were coupled by the international ratification of counterterrorism policies 
including the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against International 
Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents in 1973, the UN Convention against the Taking 
of Hostages in 1979, and the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety 
of Maritime Navigation in 1988.
14
   
 Domestically, as early as 1985, the U.S. included in its Code of Laws (U.S. Code) a 
criminal definition of terrorism.  While the criminal code did not outline appropriate actors and 
responses to terrorism, it did define terrorism as “premeditated, politically motivated violence 
against noncombatant targets by subnational groups of clandestine agents (U.S. Code Title 22, 
Chapter 38, Sections 2656a-i).”  A year later, in 1986, the first comprehensive terrorism 
legislation was enacted in the U.S., known as the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and 
Antiterrorism Act.  The purpose of this act was to protect diplomatic missions, establish security 
provisions abroad and at sea, to coordinate terrorism related assistance, to define a reward 
structure for information provided which could lead to an arrest of a suspected terrorist, and to 
create gubernatorial bodies which oversee the countermeasures for international nuclear 
terrorism and collective antiterrorism measures.   
Further legislation was drafted by the Clinton Administration in 1995 and 1996.  The 
Omnibus Counterterrorism Act of 1995 (Counter Terrorism Prevention Act) was introduced by 
Senator Joe Biden and was the first legislation to set penalties for terrorism-related crimes 
including, but not limited to, kidnappings, killings, and air-jackings, and also set criminal law 
codes for acts of transnational terrorism affording jurisdiction to the U.S. to pursue 
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investigations, detentions, and wire-tap authority for any individual, including non-citizens, 
suspected of committing or conspiring to commit a terror act.  Despite its similarities to the 
Patriot Act, which would be introduced in 2001, this bill was never signed into law, though its 
propositions remained influential in the apprehension, detention, and prosecution of terror 
suspects over the next several years (Lewis 2005, Raimo 2011).
15
  The Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act, signed into law April 1996, expanded the legal understanding and 
scope of crimes associated with terrorism, as well as increased the severity of punishments for 
these associated crimes.  It denied habeas corpus and made drastic changes to other criminal 
procedures for suspected terrorists, prohibited financial transactions with terrorist organization, 
suspended asylum procedures for suspected alien terrorists, afforded mandatory victim 
restitution, authorized law enforcement officials to arrest and detain illegal or felonious aliens, 




During the pre-9/11 era, the criminal justice system was only equipped to prosecute 
offenders with terrorist motivations if they had committed one of the following types of crimes: 
hijacking, murder, unlawful possession of nuclear material and weapons of mass destruction, 
illegal firearms charges, hostage-taking, conspiracy, assassination, and kidnapping, among 
others.  During this period, the courts lacked the capacity to prosecute or determine punishments 
for individuals associated with or providing material support to known terrorist organizations, or 
individuals who plotted attacks but did not follow through (Chesney and Goldsmith 2008).  In 
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fact, it was not until after 9/11 that U.S. Code changed to include provisions making providing 
material support or resources a felony offense (18 U.S. Code, Section 2339B).  In addition, the 
Supreme Court case of Rumsfeld v. Padilla, which was decided in a 5-4 vote in favor of 
Rumsfeld in 2004, set precedent for charging terrorist suspects, regardless of affiliation, with 
conspiracy as they could legally be deemed members of the global jihad movement.
17
  This law 
and this precedent allowed for trial by association of individuals who were suspected of 
participating in any capacity with known terrorists and terror organizations (Chesney and 
Goldsmith 2008).  
 Despite the inability of the criminal justice system to prosecute terrorists for their 
criminal associations, primary counterterrorism strategy in the U.S. still relied heavily on the 
criminal-legal system. The criminal justice strategy sought to officially criminalize terrorist 
actions leading to the apprehension, indictment, prosecution, and conviction of dozens of 
terrorist suspects before 9/11, and hundreds more following the 9/11 attacks (Marks 2006; 
Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs Press Release, 2009).  Some scholars argue that 
the criminal justice model has been the dominant counterterrorism strategy even after 9/11 
(Crelinsten and Schmid 1992, Duyvesteyn 2008, Boyle 2010, Rinehart 2010).  The U.S. 
Department of Justice (DOJ) released a statement in January 2010 that details the manner in 
which the criminal justice system is used to combat terrorism.  First, it has been useful in aiding 
intelligence operations run by local and federal law enforcement agencies and the intelligence 
community and has done so for almost a century.  Second, the DOJ has claimed to have 
prosecuted some several hundred suspects, including more than 300 incarcerations in U.S. 
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federal prison facilities citing both preemptive and retributive apprehensions and detentions.
18
  
Though many of the successes touted in this statement are post-9/11, legal research details many 
accounts of prosecutions and detentions of terrorist suspects long before the attacks.  Third, the 
consistent use of the criminal justice model is evidenced by the continual evolution of anti and 
counterterrorism laws since the 9/11.  More recent changes to U.S. Code include the prohibition 
of financial and material support of terrorist groups, later including “expert advice or assistance” 
(USA Patriot Act, 18 U.S. Code, sections 2339A and 2339B; Humanitarian Law Project v. 
Holder, 2010), the authorization of indefinite detention without trial (USA Patriot Act, section 
412), the imprisonment of any individual who harbors a terrorist suspect or conceals information 
pertinent to a terrorism investigation (USA Patriot Act, 18 U.S. Code, section 2339), and the levy 
of fines and imprisonment for any individual engaged in financial dealings with any country 
known as supporting international terrorism (USA Patriot Act, 18 U.S. Code, sections 2332d).   
These laws do not only include criminal prosecutions and penalties for individuals who 
have become terrorist suspects through the investigatory process, but also include sets of laws 
and permissions for searches and investigations of all citizens and individuals, as well as 
legalizing exceptionalities to constitutional rule of law.  Some of these provisions include the 
authorization of foreign intelligence surveillance (FISA Amendments Act of 2008), the 
permission of “suspicionless” search and seizures of documents and electronic devices of 
citizens re-entering the U.S. (United States v. Arnold, 2008), the institutionalization of racial 
profiling in both the operations manuals and practices of the FBI and local law enforcement,
19
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the indefinite detention of terrorist suspects, also called “enemy combatants” at Guantanamo Bay 
(Military Commissions Act of 2006, Detainee Treatment Act 2005), and the authorization of 




The aftermath of the September 11 attacks also led to the enactment of the Homeland 
Security Act (Public Law 107-296) and the creation of the eponymous department in 2002.  The 
subsequent governmental reorganization relocated twenty-two agencies and over 170,000 
employees and initiated a series of directives, including the National Response Plan (NRP), the 
National Incident Management System (NIMS), and a number of controversial directives 
involving the USA Patriot Act (Banks et al., 2008).  Alongside Homeland Security operations, 
private sector defense and security firms were working support and assistance operations, as well 
as protecting “critical infrastructure assets, such as telecommunications, energy, and banking”, 
advancing technological and weapons capabilities, and running crucial intelligence collection 
campaigns (Eckert 2005).   
Perhaps most important to securing the homeland are federal and local law enforcement 
efforts.  Homeland Security and federal law enforcement operations were not only confined to 
investigations of domestic terrorism, but also included the investigation, apprehension, and 
detention of transnational terrorist plots, events, and suspects.  However, homeland security 
                                                                                                                                                             
announced in this publication that the Bush administration would be the first to place a ban on the use of ethnic 
profiling practices in law enforcement operations (Department of Justice, Fact Sheet: Racial Profiling, June 17, 
2003).   
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Though the Obama administration has condemned such practices, media and news outlets have reported the 




becomes increasingly expensive, especially as terrorism moves from domestic to transnational, 
and must effectively protect an array of vulnerable points in the homeland (Sandler 2003).    
Even with all of the provisions created in the name of anti and counterterrorism since the 
1990s, and especially after September 11, the question still echoes whether or not these 
provisions have actually helped to deter or prevent future terrorist acts.  Is it reasonable to 
assume that organizations with fervent religious or ideological beliefs will be deterred by 
criminal prosecution, or even, in the case of extremist messianic organizations, the death 
penalty?  Despite even the most extraordinary criminal provisions, in many instances, and 
especially in the Obama administration, terrorist suspects are still privy to their constitutional 
guarantees of habeas corpus, public and speedy trial, the right to an impartial jury, and are 
legally considered innocent until proven guilty.  It is perhaps these institutional barriers that 
make military measures of counterterrorism seem more attractive.   
Military Responses to Terrorism in the U.S. 
Conventional wisdom and modern research suggests that after 9/11, the United States 
shifted strategy away from the criminal justice model, employing the military model of 
counterterrorism to fight its Global War on Terror (Boyle 2010, Rinehard 2010, Morag 2011, 
Erbay 2012, Crelinsten 2014).  Faced with the more immediate and dangerous threat of terrorism 
in al-Qaeda and the Taliban, decision makers were challenged to create a post-9/11 
counterterrorism strategy evolved from a criminal justice process into a “more lethal form of 
asymmetrical warfare” that was able to evade the boundaries and restrictions of the criminal 
justice system (Rinehart 2010; Solis 2016).   
Recall that the military model of counterterrorism considers the use of force to be a last 




the U.S. reveals the recurrent use of military force in response to terrorism, and not always as a 
last resort.  Though the invasion of Afghanistan after the attacks of 9/11 brought new 
considerations to military responses to terrorism, an array of covert and overt military action has 
been taken to combat terrorism since at least WWII including cruise and air missile strikes, 
ground attacks, surgical attacks, and covert low-intensity operations (Posen 2001, Alexander 
2002, Byers 2002)  
In 1985, the U.S. responded to the PLF hijacking of Italian cruiseship MS Achille Lauro 
with the deployment of U.S. Navy SEAL Team Six and Delta Force to attempt to rescue the 
passengers, many of which were American tourists (Eggen 2003).  In 1989, notorious narco-
terrorist Pablo Escobar plotted the bombing of Avianca Airliner 203 and was deemed an enemy 
of both the U.S. and Colombian governments.  Escobar was pursued in a manhunt by a Joint 
Special Operations Command of the U.S. military before he was killed by Colombian Security 
Forces in 1993 (Lubasch 1992, McFadden 1993).  David Hicks, an Australian accused of 
attending an al-Qaeda training camp and of creating a terrorist recruitment video before 2000, 
was held for seven years at Guantanamo Bay Detention Camp before being tried and convicted 
in military commission; a conviction which was later overturned (Glaberson 2008).  These are 
just a sprinkling of examples in which the U.S. has used military force against terrorism before 
9/11.   
The post-9/11 War on Terror may have helped to eliminate previous institutional and 
legal barriers to use of force in counterterrorism operations.  Perhaps one of the most important 
pieces of public law was the U.S. Patriot Act (Pub. Law 107-56) which helped to alleviate some 
of the legal barriers to counterterrorism response including relaxing certain civil liberties in the 




laws, giving more investigative power to law enforcement agencies, especially those in charge of 
border security, and increasing information sharing between intelligence and law enforcement 
agencies.
21
   
While the Patriot Act does give U.S. officials more flexibility in pursuing suspects for the 
sake of terrorism prevention, it does not explicitly address the legality of use of military force 
against suspected terrorists.
22
  However, the U.S has not been completely remiss in its legal 
justifications for use of military force abroad to combat terrorism.  It has invoked the principle of 
self-defense to legitimize its military action against terrorist groups like al-Qaeda and, more 
recently, the Islamic State.  In April 2015, the Department of Defense delivered a speech laying 
out the legal framework for all instances in which military force have been used since 9/11, 
including recent operations and air strikes in Syria.
23
  In this speech, and in many others before, 
the U.S. government cites UN Charter, Chapter VII, Article 51which affords states the “inherent 
right of individual or collective self-defense” in the event of an armed attack and permits the 
state to use any action “it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and 
security.”   
 The rhetoric of the War on Terror, accompanied by the justification of self-defense was 
not only meant to gain the sympathy and support of an international audience, but also to assure 
the American public of the necessity for military action in response to an historic terrorist attack.  
The Bush administration framed the War on Terror as an opportunity for the country to “unite in 
steadfast determination and resolve” in the “monumental struggle of good versus evil.”  The 
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struggle the administration was referring to was the fight against terrorism, with the U.S. 
embodying the “good” and al-Qaeda, the terrorists, representing the “evil” that sought to destroy 
U.S. “freedom” and “democracy.”
24
  These words were met with overwhelming public approval 
and the frequent framing of “good versus evil” helped to cultivate and sustain a level of support 
for both the Administration and its defense policy decisions (Entman 2003).   
 Just as Operation Enduring Freedom was not the U.S.’ first military response to 
terrorism, it was also not the first time the U.S. had invoked its right to self-defense in order to 
retaliate militarily against terrorist actions.  Rhetoric of ‘us versus them,’ ‘good versus evil,’ ‘life 
or death’ and the duty to self-defense can be seen at least as far back to at least the 1980s and 
even before.  Particularly, the paradigm of self-defense has allowed the United States to act with 
force in response to terrorist bombings of the U.S. embassy in Beirut in 1983, the bombings of a 
Berlin discotheque in 1986, an assassination attempt against President Bush in 1993, and the 
1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania to name only a few.  In each of 
these cases, the U.S. declared an obligation to protect its citizens and its homeland from terrorist 
acts and its inherent right to self-defense in order to employ and to justify a military model of 
counterterrorism.  Public support garnered through this rhetoric remained crucial to the 
continued operations and financing of military responses to terrorism (Sapiro 2003).   
 In addition, this rhetoric has helped to garner various displays of support from the 
international community.  The U.S. Department of State, in its statement on the first 100 days in 
the War on Terror, reported that the U.S. received an “outpouring of support” from the 
“collective will of the world.”
25
  In fact, 196 countries supported initial operations in 2001 to 
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interrupt terrorist financial networks, and in April 2003, nearly 50 countries had joined the 
Coalition of the Willing.  Even before 9/11, nations, as well as some non-governmental 
organizations, supported counterterrorist military operations in Sudan, Iraq, Iran, and Yemen, to 
name a few, as early as the 1970s (Allen 1992, Prunckun and Mohr 1997, Marrazzo 2001, 
Benjamin 2010).   
In some ways this support has led not only to a general acceptance of military responses 
to terrorism, but also to wide internalization of U.S. style counterterrorism policy and strategy.  
While the military model has received fairly harsh criticism and opposition, its utilization by 
countries like the U.S., Israel, Russia, and Turkey throughout the last two decades has shifted the 
general trend of counterterrorism strategy worldwide.  The U.S. and several European Union 
states have routinely cooperated militarily, especially in the areas of counter-jihadi components 
of counterterrorism strategy.  Individually, these states are using military means, alongside law 
enforcement investigations, to eliminate terrorist financing, to stop the flow of foreign fighters, 
specific to ISIS, and to improve ongoing humanitarian crises as a result of terrorist organizations 
and weak government capacities to subdue them (Davies 2017).   
Global counterterrorism measures in response to ISIS demonstrate an additional 
component of the military model; the military is not only used in matters of armed conflict with 
regard to anti- and counterterrorism, but is also used for other internal and external response 
types.  The military may engage in joint military operations of law enforcement trainings abroad 
to help local law enforcement and militaries increase their capabilities to combat terrorism in 
their home countries as the U.S. has done in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, among other 
areas.  Special Forces and intelligence operatives generally work to defeat terrorist organizations 




departments as well as to local organizations and to law enforcement of the host countries 
(Readman 2004).  The military also helps to tighten and secure borders, as well as to monitor 
internal movement alongside local law enforcement in host countries.  Often, military operatives 
abroad take on actions of public diplomacy and community building projects in order to establish 
a positive image about their involvement in counterterrorism operations in host nations abroad.    
The Call for Global Counterterrorism Strategy 
Recent advances in global counterterrorism strategy reflect the long history of the United 
States calling for a coordinated global response to the terrorist threat; a call which dates back to 
at least the proposal of the League of Nations in 1937 (Deflem 2006).  As terrorism began to 
intensify in the later half of the twentieth century, international counterterrorism efforts increased 
as well.  In the wake of 9/11, global calls for cooperative counterterrorism saw states responding 
with varying degrees of support and condemnation of terrorism.  While some were resistant to 
the rhetoric of the ‘axis of evil’ and rebuked the immediate military action of the U.S., others, 
such as some NATO nations and Australia, provided immediate combat support to U.S. military 
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq (Buckley and Fawn 2003).  Though several states entered into 
an international ‘Coalition of the Willing,’ a military and political alliance against state 
sponsored terrorism in Iraq, the U.S. remained at the forefront of decision making in what may 
have been the only modern example of an international counterterrorism regime outside of the 
United Nations (UN) (Finn 2010). 
The UN officially adopted a “Global Counterterrorism Strategy” (GCS) on September 8, 
2006, nearly five years after the 9/11 attacks on the U.S.  For years the U.S. pushed UN states to 
generate and engage in concerted efforts to combat terrorism globally through the creation of 




terrorism would aim to collectively “prevent and combat” it.
26
  Prior to the adoption of the GCS, 
and even more so, prior to the events of 9/11, the U.S. made perfunctory attempts to gather allies 
into a “anti-terror regime” with common goals of delegitimizing rogue states and terrorists, their 
demands and their actions, preventing “indiscriminate harm” from civilians and non-combatants 
as policy, and committing to lowering the costs of counterterrorism while simultaneously 
increasing the costs of committing terrorist acts (Boyle 2008).   
 After 9/11, the U.S. deemed an anti-terror coalition as a necessary component of its grand 
strategy in the War on Terror.  It petitioned the UN Security Council to approve Resolution 
1373, which called for systematic international cooperation in the prevention of terrorism and 
was passed unanimously (Terlingen 2010).  What the U.S. had in mind as far as follow through 
on this petition differed greatly from pre-9/11 plans for a counterterrorism regime.  Instead, the 
U.S. centered its efforts on the coalition of the willing, whose primary purpose of combatting 
terrorism remained the same, but the means by which that would be accomplished had shifted 
entirely.  This post-9/11 counterterrorism coalition still sought to delegitimize terrorism but also 
focused on policing rogue states, promoting democracy and democratic transition, and 
preventive war and preemptive action (Westphal 2003, Boyle 2010).     
 The Coalition of the Willing was highly criticized as a political tool which provided 
legitimacy to the Iraq War rather than hailed as a genuine mechanism in international 
counterterrorism collaboration.  Critics were quick to point out that most of the 46 states in the 
coalition were “small, poor countries, with no obvious political stake in the war (Newnham 
2008),” though large-economy members included states such as Australia, United Kingdom, and 
Spain.  This coalition was not a formal-legal organization, but was a military alliance created to 
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manage the risk of today’s terrorist threats.  However, without the formal-legal regulations, as 
exist in bodies such as the UN and NATO, to ensure compliance from its members, or the 
absence of the coalition’s formation around common interest or international norms such as 
collective international security, states routinely “pulled out of the coalition”  (Aslam 2013; 
Williams 2009).  Specifically, Operation Iraqi Freedom lacked broad support of the coalition 
members and left the U.S. to develop policy and pursue military counterterrorism strategy 
without the backing of the coalition at large (Aslam 2013).      
Whether it be applied force, intelligence gathering, or humanitarianism, the role of the 
military in counterterrorism measures operates within the confines, or at least alongside, an 
existing rules of engagement.  In some ways, the military model of counterterrorism is subject to 
the same, or similar, regulations that set the standards for criminal justice measures.  Military 
measures of counterterrorism must still be aware, if not vigilant, of U.S. constitutional 
guarantees and practices, and of the boundaries of international law.  The next section discusses 
the limits that existing legal frameworks impose on both the military and criminal justice models 
of counterterrorism.   
Counterterrorism and the Observance of Domestic and International Law  
Both the criminal justice and military models are bound by existing precedents, 
regulations, and laws.  In criminal justice counterterrorism responses, the U.S. is bound by rule 
of law and the U.S. Constitution and can only exercise its right to violence and punishment on 
those suspected and found guilty of committing a crime (Crelinsten 2009).  The observance of 
democratic principles and foundations are revered as fundamental in the fight against terrorism, 
and the primary consideration of counterterrorism “must be the protection and maintenance of 




(Clutterbuck 2004; Steven and Gunaranta 2004).  Thus, terrorism is seen as a form or 
combination of criminal activities that can be punished and defeated through criminal justice 
laws and institutions.   
As such, the United States is required to abide by all domestic laws in the pursuit and 
prosecution of terrorist suspects and afford them all rights guaranteed by the constitution.  
Terrorist suspects are effectively awarded equal protection under the law and, like any other 
criminal suspect, are presumed innocent until proven guilty.   Under this equal protection 
guarantee and under title 42 of U.S. Code 1981, all persons, including terror suspects, have the 
same right to make and enforce contracts, to sue, to give evidence, to be guaranteed security, 
sentences, and punishments commensurate with convictions regardless of race or other prejudice, 
and are still guaranteed the right to due process, habeas corpus, speedy and public trial and other 
rights enumerated in the U.S. Constitution.   
In addition, where counterterrorism activities, either criminal justice or military, 
transcend borders and involve incidences of transnational terrorism, all states, including the U.S., 
must adhere to international law, including international humanitarian law (IHL) and the Geneva 
Convention.  IHL does not specifically define terrorism but does specifically prohibit “measures 
of terrorism” and “acts of terrorism” against persons not taking part in hostilities.  While strict 
interpretation of IHL reads that these rules apply only to the context of international armed 
conflict, recent and more loose interpretations of the law argue that its regulation includes any 
act of violence against civilians or individuals no longer taking part in hostilities (i.e., military 
personnel no longer engaged in combat; Saul 2017).
27
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Regardless of whether one subscribes to a strict or loose interpretation of IHL, the U.S. 
brought terrorism, counterterrorism, and IHL into the same conversation when they were 
criticized by human rights groups, legal officers, and political pundits about extended military 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan as part of the War on Terror.  The U.S. submitted to the 
Geneva Conventions in that it treated the Taliban as a de facto state party, legitimizing sustained 
military action against it, but at the same time declared that other enemies, such as members of 
al-Qaeda, were “unlawful enemy combatants”, not representatives of any state and therefore 
were not under the protection of standards of treatment and detention laid out in the Geneva 
Convention (Fischer 2006; Brooks 2004, Murphy 2006).   
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention, also known as the Treatment of Prisoners 
of War, declares that states are bound to a specific code of conduct in the pursuit, detention, 
interrogation, and so forth, which requires the humane treatment of suspects, free from 
discrimination, unnecessary infliction of bodily harm or illness, violence to life and persons 
(murder, mutilation, and torture), and from the personal degradation of undignified treatment, all 
while ensuring that the apprehended individual is properly cared for in a manner of health and 
receives all liberties regarding due process and impartial adjudication.   
Under this article, those falling into the category of prisoner of war must be guaranteed 
certain rights.  Though the U.S. had once argued in favor of the Taliban being considered 
representatives of the state of Afghanistan to justify military counterterrorism measures, later, 
then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, argued that it was a stretch to give Taliban the 
protections of Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.  In response to criticisms of the treatment of 
Taliban and al-Qaeda detainees, Rumsfeld spoke,  
The Taliban did not wear distinctive signs, insignias, symbols or uniforms … To 




population of Afghanistan, they sought to blend in with civilian non-combatants, 
hiding in mosques and populated areas. They [were] not organized in military 




He continued with the conclusion that since they did not present themselves as traditional 
military combatants, they could not be treated as such and could not be guaranteed the 
protections of prisoner of war status.  The legal and political community, though often critical of 
U.S. policy regarding the War on Terror, has yet to agree on the applicability of IHL to 
transnational terrorism and counterterrorism law.  More relevant than a discussion of IHL, is, 
perhaps, the relationship between counterterrorism and domestic law.   
It is clear that a respect for rule of law and democracy must be at the forefront of criminal 
justice  approaches to counterterrorism, which necessarily implies that terrorism be treated as a 
crime, defined by and subject to the existing criminal legal system.  Terrorism is not defined in 
U.S. legal code as a criminal act in and of itself, but rather, certain acts associated with terrorism 
such as kidnapping, hostage taking, murder, and assault fall under the purview of the criminal 
justice system.  To be precise, one cannot be prosecuted under U.S. penal code for terrorism by 
definition, but must be prosecuted for the individual crimes committed that may be associated as 
terrorist acts.  Therefore, suggestions and questions of motives and intentionality, which are 
crucial to the identification of an act as terrorism, become overshadowed by a preoccupation 
with criminal-legal procedure and application of existing categorizations of actual crimes 
committed.   
A Complex Relationship of Government Response with Terrorism 
 Given that the criminal justice and military models are conceptually designed to combat 
terrorism, we must ask under what conditions should either model be employed, how terrorism 
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impacts each of these models and, most importantly, how effective is each approach is at 
deterring future terrorism.  Conventional wisdom and research suggests that prior to 9/11, the 
criminal justice model was the primary, if not only, approach employed by the U.S. to combat 
terrorism (Steven and Gunaratna 2004). International Relations and International Law research 
even suggests a pattern of “September 10 thinking” and “September 12 thinking (Crelinsten 
2009, 2014; Palin 2015 ).”  In this frame, September 11 signaled a paradigmatic shift in strategy 
away from the criminal justice model toward the military model for the United States with regard 
to combatting terrorism.  Before 9/11, decision makers had greater concerns of human rights and 
civil liberties and protection of the rule of law and were highly critical of displays of force in 
responding to terrorism, exemplifying Crelinsten’s (2009) “September 10 thinking.”  In fact, 
decision makers were so deterred by military responses to terrorism that they often employed the 
criminal justice model “even at the expense of reduced effectiveness of counterterrorist measures 
(Steven and Gunaratna 2004).”  After 9/11 and the ensuing War on Terror, decision makers 
believed the threat of terrorism to be persistent and imminent, incapable of being deterred 
through law enforcement means, and committed to the mind-set that the enemy can only be 
deterred through displays of maximal force, exemplifying “September 12 thinking.” 
This dichotomy of thought suggests that the criminal justice model was the approach 
used by the U.S. until 9/11.  However, in practice, counterterrorism measures in the United 
States are and have been carried out by a vast network of agents, including law makers and 
legislators, bureaucratic and law enforcement agencies, the intelligence community, civilian and 
defense contractors, and the military.  The agencies involved in counterterrorism are not limited 
to the most obvious Homeland Security and FBI, but, in fact, include efforts from most 




of Defense, Department of Energy, Department of the Interior, and the Department of 
Agriculture to name a few.  In fact, in 2006, the U.S. government issued a memorandum calling 
for “cooperative national security and counterterrorism efforts” along U.S. borders from the 
coordinated efforts of the Departments of Homeland Security, Interior, and Agriculture.
29
   
While of these actors play a crucial role in combatting terrorism, especially in the 
homeland, exploration into the historical post-attack responses of the U.S. reveal many instances 
where the military was deployed in response to a terror threat, either as the sole actor or in 
conjunction with these criminal justice actors. This brings into question the validity of this 
dichotomy (September 10 and September 12 thinking) as well as the validity of the general claim 
that the criminal justice model is the primary, or first response, counterterrorism strategy in the 
U.S. (either before or after 9/11).  Even in 1970s, policies emphasized criminal justice approach 
but “ultimately embraced a military solution because of weaknesses in that model (Macken 
2011; Crelinsten and Schmid 1993).”   
The criminal justice and military models are thought to be both preemptive, bringing 
existing terrorism to a halt, and deterrent of future terror acts.  However, both models may be 
limited in their preemptive capabilities.  The criminal justice model treats terrorism as a crime 
and a problem for domestic law enforcement.  In this model, terrorists can only be punished for 
crimes that they have already committed, leaving out the possibility of retribution for evil intent.  
This model is limited by the laws and institutions of the federal criminal justice system, exact 
legal definitions of crimes, and standards of punishment and sentencing. The question of whether 
or not terrorists will be deterred by prosecution, but guaranteed protection of their civil liberties 
in the event of their apprehension is an important one.  Some have asked whether or not 
                                                 
29
 This memorandum was issued and signed by the participating agencies in March of 2006.  A copy of the signed 




prevention or preemption actually fit into the conceptual framework of the criminal justice model 
(Macken 2011).   
The military model also exhibits an unexpected and complex relationship with terrorism.  
Some may think of the impact of terrorism as a one-shot deal; terrorist event occurs, the impact 
of the event leads to a government response (policy change, military action, or otherwise), and 
thus ends the effect of the initial event, while others have shown terrorism to have persistent 
effects.  Again, the question of whether the model is effective at preventing terrorism is an 
important one.   
One perspective posits increased military activity has been statistically shown to increase 
the supply of terrorism, rendering the military model not only ineffective, but potentially 
dangerous.  Braithwaite and Li (2007) while demonstrating that places that experience high 
levels of terrorism are more likely to experience future terrorism, find that military conflict 
involvement is also a significant predictor of future supplies of terrorism.  In addition, they find 
that greater military capability increases the likelihood of future attacks upon a nation.  Azam 
and Thelen (2010) find that active military intervention from the U.S. increases the supply of 
terrorism in recipient countries.  Furthermore, they suggest that Western democracies with 
interventionist policies, such as the U.S., are more likely to be the main targets of terrorist 
attacks.  Savun and Phillips (2009) pioneered this vein of thought when they empirically 
demonstrated that democratic states like the U.S. are more likely to be targeted by terrorist 
groups because of aggressive foreign policies and military alliances.   
Another perspective suggests employing the military model to be the “rationalist 
approach” which requires an increase in physical security to generate an outcome of change in 




war model not only as the most effective preventive approach, but perhaps, the only approach 
(Fearon 1995, Lake 2002, Abrahms 2008).  In this view, extremist groups use terrorism to elicit 
disproportionate responses that garner sympathy for the group and radicalizes moderates, 
generating greater support circles and spheres of influence.  What ensues is a bargaining model 
where the capabilities and choices of both actors are endogenous, ultimately resulting in terrorist 
violence because no bargains fall within the acceptable range for the terrorist organization.  As a 
result, “bargaining over a particular issue now is subordinated to a broader strategy of using 
violence to the change the relative capabilities” of the opponent (Lake 2002).   
Research on terrorism also suggests that the supply of terrorism itself may have an impact 
on when the military model might be employed by the U.S.  Where the criminal justice model 
may be effective in instances of “low yield” terrorism, or terrorism that is committed by repeat 
actors yielding smaller magnitudes of damage and casualties, the military model is likely to be 
more effective at combating “high yield” attacks (Bhoumik 2005; Macken 2011).  High yield 
terrorism, or terrorism of great frequency or magnitude of damage and casualties, is “more 
difficult than ordinary crime” and the criminal justice system “cannot incapacitate those 
affiliated with” this type of terrorism (Bhoumik 2005).  In fact, some proponents of the military 
model, including former Secretary of State George Schultz, believe that the United States must 
be willing to use military force, while many academics also agree that when countered with 
ongoing threat or armed attack the U.S. must immediately respond with force in order to 
eliminate said threat (Erickson 1989, Lobel 1999, Kosnik 2000).
30
  It has even been concluded 
that use of military force is the most effective response to terrorism (Eppright 1997).   
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Shortcomings of the Counterterrorism Models 
It seems that the decision makers and academics have yet to agree on which model is 
most effective at countering terrorism, in general, and in the context of the U.S., in particular.  
The bulk of the literature seems to suggest that criminal justice measures were effective, until 
9/11, at which point they became mostly obsolete (Macken 2011).  At any rate, both models have 
been subject to harsh criticisms conceptually and in practical applications.   
The criminal justice model, in any state, and especially democratic ones, works through 
domestic and, at times, international law to pursue justice after a terrorist attack.  The overriding 
principle of the criminal justice response is a commitment to the protection of the liberal 
principles and constitutional guarantees mentioned above, as well as ensuring human treatment 
of detained suspects (Chalk 1998).  Uncompromising adherence to these principles and to the 
law presents several limitations to this model. 
First, all criminal acts, including acts associated with terrorism are subject to “reasonable 
suspicion and evidence-based criminal justice processes (McCulloch and Pickering 2009).”  
Much of what we know about suspected terrorists comes from the intelligence gathering process.  
Information that results from this process, though sufficient for intelligence-based decision 
making, is not always admissible in a court of law.  For example, forms of hearsay, such as a 
witness reporting that a third party informed him of the suspect’s intent to commit a terrorist act, 
would not be admissible in a criminal trial, but would be important evidence in an intelligence 
gathering mission (Chesney and Goldsmith 2008).  There is great burden on the state to produce 
relevant and admissible evidence against the defendant to prove his or her guilt beyond a 




Second, prior to 9/11, it was nearly impossible to criminally indict someone for being a 
member of or providing support to a terrorist or terror organization.  Of course that changed after 
Padilla’s Supreme Court trial and when providing material support to a terrorist was made a 
criminal offense by the U.S. Patriot Act (18 U.S. Code Section 2339a-b).  Still, the idea of trying 
an individual in criminal court for these offenses is met with criticism by those who argue 
individuals should not be punished for the acts of someone else or be tried for being “guilty by 
association (Cole and Dempsey 2006, Gouvin 2003).”    
Third, the criminal court systems must respect due process, habeas corpus, and other civil 
liberties guaranteed by the Constitution and international law.  In the landmark case of Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld, Yaser Hamdi petitioned the court for the right of due process for enemy combatant 
detainees.  The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Hamdi affording terrorist suspects, and all 
detainees, the right to challenge their legal status as enemy combatant, as well as imparting upon 
them full legal rights bestowed by the  Constitution and protecting them against unlawful 
imprisonment (habeas corpus; Anderson 2004, Martinez 2004).   
Finally, apprehending individuals outside the U.S. proves an incredible difficulty.  In 
cases in which a suspect is residing overseas the U.S. must work through extradition requests and 
procedures, or must use force to capture the individual directly.  Unfortunately, not all countries 
have formal extradition treaties with the U.S., and diplomatic efforts to convince governments to 
extradite terrorist suspects are not always successful.  Law enforcement agencies legally 
operating within the boundaries of these nations are often at the behest of local government and 
law enforcement demands (Chesney and Goldsmith 2008).  
Similarly, military actions are subject to restrictions and have returned mixed results.  In 




retaliation for its own sake is not an acceptable justification according to domestic or 
international law.  Military force must be in response to an existing or imminent attack, should 
be proportional in measure, and should not “inflict unnecessary suffering on the terrorist,” but 
instead should seek to “contain the hostile situation (Erickson 1989).”  The UN Charter affords 
two exceptions to the prohibition of the use of force in international relations: (1) when it 
involves the restoration of peace and security, and (2) when the right the self-defense is invoked 
(Article 51).  When the Security Council condemned the September 11 attacks and expressed its 
commitment to combat future terrorism, it also reaffirmed the right to individual and collective 
self-defense, the only condition under which it explicitly authorized use of force to combat 
terrorism.  One caveat is the case of active state sponsored terrorism in which the Law of Armed 
Conflict (LOAC) comes into play, providing for the escalation of conflict and use of force, still 
in the name of self-defense, and requiring states act in accordance with the Geneva Convention.  
Second, there is the question of the effectiveness of military force in combatting terrorism.  
Many policy makers and scholars have asked whether or not military strikes succeed in 
preventing or deterring future terrorist attacks (Gross 2005, Banks et al, 2008, Feridun and 
Shabaz 2010).   
 Third, military options almost always have unintended consequences, whether it be 
causing damage to property and equipment or harming civilians and inflict civilian casualties, 
not to mention loss of life of the soldiers in combat.  An argument may be made that 
advancements in technology and global infrastructure have made military operations more 
precise in identifying targets and executing counter measures, but the question remains as to 
whether or not the externalities are worth the tradeoff of military engagement, especially if it is 




 Finally, research has suggested that the use of military force can, itself, incite terrorism.  
Both qualitative narratives and quantitative research has posited that aggressive foreign policy, 
including heightening of military operations abroad, may be a catalyst for future terrorism 
activity (Banks et al., 2008, Savun and Phillips 2009, Choi and Piazza 2016).   
 Additionally, there are not only conceptual problems with the military model of 
counterterrorism, but are also many challenges when putting the model to practice.  First, there 
must be clear standards of what degree of association with terrorism warrants a military 
response, including overt uses of force, tribunals, and detentions.  In the Rumsfeld v. Hamdi 
decision, the Supreme Court upheld the legality of military detention of terrorist suspects without 
indictment or trial until the “cessation of hostilities”, citing that the principle of indefinite 
detention in this case was a “fundamental and accepted… incident to war” which held the 
purpose of keeping these individuals out of future, yet related, hostilities and terrorist events (542 
U.S. 507; Chesney and Goldsmith 2008).
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  While this verdict has raised the eyebrows of certain 
human and civil rights organizations, the Supreme Court determined indefinite detention without 
trial, in the context of ongoing hostilities, to be within the confines of the U.S. Constitution and 
that it is not in legal violation of the rights and liberties of the detained individual.  This verdict 
online outlines the legality of detention after the fact; it does not set precedent for the conditions 
under which an individual may be detained or pursued via military means.   
 Second, the nature of new terrorist groups no longer typifies traditional understandings of 
terror groups within the military model, subverting “the considerations that ordinarily justify the 
minimal procedures afforded” by the detention aspects of the model itself (Chesney and 
Goldsmith 2008).  Where terrorists were once viewed as substate civilian actors, new terrorists 
are understood, especially in the U.S., as their own category of combatant; unlawful enemy 
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combatant.  This complex understanding of a new class of combatant soldiers who do not wear 
uniforms, do not openly bear arms, do not organize as traditional military units, and often hide 
among the civilian population makes it extraordinarily difficult to apply even the most 
rudimentary strategies of the military model.   
 Third, the fact that the military model does not clearly define criteria in terms of 
associational status nor does it incorporate a clear conceptualization of the new terrorism leads to 
two unfortunate possibilities: erroneous detentions and lack of negotiating prospects.  While the 
military relies on intelligence to sniff out terrorist operatives living among the population, all 
individuals apprehended, operative or innocent civilian, have the incentive to disavow 
association with the terrorist group.  In effect, this increases the risk of persecuting and detaining 
innocents, as there is little to differentiate them from the actual terrorists, informants often supply 
false information, and the tactics we might use during interrogation might even causes an 
innocent person to confess to a nonexistent association status (Crelinsten 2002, Darmer 2003, 
Arrigo 2004).  Even more so, as militaries move away from basic operations into the more 
extreme measures, such as targeted killings and air strikes, they run the risk of civilian collateral 
damage (Wilkinson 2001, Silke 2003).  If there is little incentive for terrorists to identify 
themselves, especially those associated with large, high resolve networks such as al-Qaeda or al-
Shabab, there is even smaller incentive to negotiate on the larger scale of the hostilities 
(Crelinsten 2009).  
Conclusions  
 The U.S. has a long and storied history with terrorism, specifically transnational 
terrorism.  While terrorist attacks have evolved to become more intense and high yield, strategies 




that a paradigmatic shift from one counterterrorism model to another occurred with 9/11, history 
of counterterrorism practice shows a fairly consistent strategy of mixing or at least alternating 
criminal justice and military responses over time.  It also suggests that public support for these 
strategies is important in their deployment and continuation.   
Overall, neither approach, criminal nor military, has been singularly effective, signaling 
an appropriate counterterrorism strategy should include multiple strategies and tactics from both 
approaches.   Due to the violent nature of terrorism it is difficult to draw boundaries between any 
of the pillars of counterterrorism, let alone between the judiciary and retaliatory processes 
(Crelinsten 1998).  Because both are sometimes employed simultaneously, it is also difficult to 
measure the effectiveness of each on its own. It also seems that there is a discrepancy between 
the theory and practice of how and when these models are employed, with theory suggesting the 
primary employment of criminal-legal tactics, using force only as a last resort, but historical 
practice demonstrating use of force as a primary tactic in response to transnational terror.  A 
closer investigation of empirical evidence is needed to know how and when the government will 
employ one model over or in conjunction with the other, and how these strategies affect relevant 
political processes.      





Chapter 3: Theorizing the Counterterrorism Models 
The previous chapters laid out two conceptual models of counterterrorism: criminal 
justice and military, and the history of their practice in the United States.  While the International 
Relations and Law literature has outlined a general understanding of what these models are, they 
lack a thorough explanation of what they do in terms of identifying relevant actors, actions, and 
guidelines in counterterrorism strategy and what results and implications can be expected from 
them.  In order to use these models for empirical investigation they must be further theorized 
with their propositions and assumption explicitly laid out.   
The Theory Building Process 
 In order to move onto to the theories of the models themselves, there must be a basic 
understanding of the theory building process, including basic knowledge what a theory is, what it 
does, its component parts, and how it can be used.  A theory is a logically interrelated set of 
propositions about “reality”.  It is a “statement of the suspected relationships between and 
among” phenomena (Gelso 2006; Schutt 2015).  Propositions about “reality” need not be based 
in experience or empirical observation as this is the purpose of hypothesis testing.  Rather 
theories and the propositions they assert help to organize the subject matter of phenomena, make 
sense of unobservable relationship of entities, connect and determine causes by which sense is 
made of observable entities, and explore why these associations among entities obtain (Waltz 
2010).   
Theories are important because they help us to simplify reality in order to classify 
entities, processes, and relationships and to understand how and why they occur.  Theories guide 
us in our research providing conceptual and operational definitions, identifying processes, setting 




parsimonious yet thorough and it should be falsifiable.  Falsifiability, first explained by Karl 
Popper, means that a theory can be negated or disproven; an important quality for the pursuit of 
scientific knowledge.   
 Theories are comprised of definitions, operational definitions, and functional 
relationships.  Definitions introduce terms that refer to basic elements within the theory, whereas 
operational definitions relate theoretical statements to a set of possible observations.  Functional 
relationships lay out the basic relationships among concepts within the theory. Theoretical 
statements about functional relationships may be classified as axioms and assumptions.  Axioms 
and assumptions allow for the derivation of hypotheses about causality among these functional 
relationships. By nature, functional relationships “embody simplification,” meaning in order to 
arrive at them one must isolate bodies and entities both individually and together in abstraction 
of observables and experiences of reality in order to aggregate and idealize the relationship 
among those entities representative of a particular phenomenon (Waltz 2010).  Axioms are the 
declarations in a theory about which we feel certain.  They require no expansive explanation or 
further evidentiary proof; we accept them to be intrinsically true.   Assumptions are suppositions 
that are accepted, for the purposes of the theory, without questioning or proof.  The definitions of 
axiom and assumption may sound similar, but in fact, there is a crucial difference.  Axioms are 
self-evident truths that require no proof, whereas assumptions are something we must accept to 
be true, regardless of proof, in order to move forward with the theory.   
 Hypotheses, a form of proposition, are derived from assumptions.  It is a statement about 
what a researcher expects to find that does not yet have empirical support.  These statements may 
be about the nature of the relationship among singular entities, operationalized as variables, 




are useful because they allow for theories to be tested using the scientific method.  Hypothesis 
testing in social science can be done quantitatively or qualitatively, but must be done with rigor 
and replicability.  While it may be suggested that hypothesis testing is the ultimate goal of theory 
building, it is neither necessary nor sufficient in order for a theory to be considered complete.  
Hypothesis testing is fundamental to the social sciences because it affords empirical evidence of 
the associations among social entities, allowing for the systematic and scientific analysis social 
phenomena.   
Criminal Justice Model 
The process of theory building requires the explicit statement of both the self-evident 
truths, or axioms, and the primary assumptions derived from the content of the counterterrorism 
models.  Recall, the criminal justice model is foregrounded in the thought that the criminal 
justice system is used to combat and prevent terrorism.  Considering the full conceptualization of 
the model, there are four axioms, which are assumed to be true independent of any contingencies 
in other moving parts in the model. 
Axiom 1. In the criminal justice model, terrorism is a crime.  In this model, terrorism is 
perceived to occur within the context of existing statutes of criminal activity.  This approach 
requires that the label of “terrorism” be attached to a specific criminal conduct violation as 
defined by US Code, the U.S. Constitution, and sometimes international law.  As such, it 
necessitates the provision of certain rights and liberties to the defendants to ensure the integrity 
of democratic principles, namely rule of law, are upheld.   
Axiom 2.  The criminal justice model employs rule of law to detain, prosecute, and 
punish terrorist suspects. The second axiom is almost subsumed by the first in that since 




of the criminal legal system which are a representation of the democratic commitment to rule of 
law.  This commitment to rule of law is crucial to the criminal justice model, since it defines the 
limits of state response strategy and guarantees protection of individual rights and liberties 
throughout the detention, prosecution, and sentencing processes.   
Axiom 3.  In the criminal justice model, the state exercises restraint with regard to its 
monopoly on violence. Because the criminal justice model relies mainly on the capabilities of 
law enforcement, policy makers, and judicial officials to combat and prevent terrorism, the use 
of violence against terrorist suspects is both disgraced and disparaged (Lee 2007).  Instead of 
responding to terrorism with displays of force, the criminal justice model purports to prevent 
future terrorism with the threat of prosecution and imprisonment (LaFree and Hendrickson 
2007).  Early qualitative research suggests that criminal-legal responses to terrorism are the best 
long-term strategy to combatting future terrorism, implying that violent, military responses may 
only be successful in the short term (Crenshaw 1983).  These findings support the belief in the 
effectiveness of criminal punishments, which curtail the freedoms and liberties of the 
perpetrators, as a disincentive to commit terrorist acts.    
Axiom 4. The criminal justice model is concerned with the preservation of democracy 
and civil liberties.  The necessary conclusion to the first three axioms is that democratic 
principles matter.  The criminal justice model, in its preoccupation with the rule of law, the rights 
of the accused, and restraint on violence, seeks to preserve the core of democratic values which 
are viewed as a “fundamental premise in the fight against terror (Pedahzur and Ranstorp 2001).”  
In this model, the preservation of liberal principles is as important, if not more so, than the 




 These axioms of the criminal justice model should are given as evidently true.  It is from 
these axioms that assumptions, or things we must accept to be true, can be derived. These 
assumptions must be accepted as a common sense type of truth in order for the theory to have 
utility, especially with regard to hypothesis testing (Coppedge 2002). 
Assumption 1.  The criminal justice model relies on domestic and international legal 
systems to regulate the detention, prosecution, and sentencing of terror suspects.  In a criminal 
justice approach to terrorism, decision-makers rely on the extensive guidelines, regulations, laws 
and institutions that comprise the existing criminal-legal system.  That said, the ambiguity of the 
law generates a system of responses to terrorism that test the boundaries of the relatively elastic 
criminal justice system (Cassese 2001, Byers 2002, Goodman and Jinks 2004).  As detailed in 
Chapter 2, in the context of the United States, criminal-legal approaches to terrorism must abide 
by laws set forth in the U.S. Constitution and U.S. Code domestically, and are also subject to 
public international law (jus ad bellum and jus ad bello) such as the Geneva Conventions (Ratner 
2002, Taft 2003, Sloane 2008).  This approach to counterterrorism ensures that judiciary 
processes oversee the detention, prosecution, and sentencing of terror suspects and adjudicates 
the establishment of any special courts or procedures for trying terror suspects.   
Assumption 2.  Since both domestic and international criminal legal systems may oversee 
the detention and prosecution of terrorist suspects, the criminal justice model must be applicable 
to both domestic and transnational terrorism.  I have previously asserted the U.S. conviction to 
uphold both U.S. Code as well as public international law.  As far as international law is 
concerned, the United States prides itself on “moral leadership in the international community” 
and must adhere to international human rights law and provide all criminal suspects the judicial 




domestic and international laws overlap in some ways.  While the tendency in the academic field 
is to distinguish between domestic and international terrorism, domestic legal code has often left 
the type of terrorism undefined or has explicitly addressed provisions dealing with the 
prosecution of foreign terrorists or terrorist acts that occur abroad.  For example, the Alien and 
Sedition Acts in 1798 were meant to deal exclusively with the threat that foreign nationals posed 
to American security, while section 2332b of the AEDPA is entitled “Acts of Terrorism 
Transcending National Boundaries” and details the definition of and penalties for committing 
transnational terrorism against the U.S. However, many of the public laws enacted regarding 
terrorism do not define or specify how they would apply to instances of domestic versus 
transnational terrorism; in essence there is a “blurring” in the distinction between the two 
categories (Sandler 2003).   Therefore, an assumption can be made that the criminal justice 
approach to counterterrorism can be used when faced with domestic or transnational terrorism.   
Assumption 3.  Concern with the preservation of democratic principles and human rights 
ensures that the criminal justice model is the first-line strategy in counterterrorism.  It has already 
been established and definitively stated in axiom four that the criminal justice model seeks the 
protection of democracy and civil liberties as much as it seeks the restraint of actual terrorism.  
In fact, it has been argued that the criminal justice model views the promotion of democracy and 
rule of law as a necessary component of the strategy to combat terrorism and that the observation 
of rule of law reduces the likelihood of a state experiencing a terrorist event (Choi 2010).  In 
fighting terrorism, the U.S. has maintained its commitment to democracy and its values including 
the observation and respect for human rights and the guarantee of basic civil liberties.  If the 
primary counterterrorism strategy must consider what is best for the maintenance of these values, 




rights and liberties are upheld.  Namely, if we assume these democratic principles to be the most 
important component to combating terrorism (see Choi 2010, Chesney and Goldsmith 2008), 
then the dominant strategy used in response to terrorism must include this component by 
definition.  Therefore, the assumption can be made that if the protection of civil liberties and rule 
of law, among other things, is crucial to the deterrence of terrorism, as crucial as the deterrence 
of terrorism itself, then the first-line strategy in deterring terrorism must include a criminal-legal 
response in which the rule of law is practiced and civil liberties and human rights are observed.     
Assumption 4.  The criminal justice model was more effective at deterring terrorism and 
employed primarily before the attacks of September 11.  Criminological studies suggest that 
convictions and pre-crime (plotted but yet to be realized) counterterrorism measures including 
criminal investigations and prosecution have had a preventive effect on future terrorist activity 
(McCulloch and Pickering 2009).  Prior to 9/11, it seemed, that with the introduction of the 1984 
Combat International Terrorism Act (PL 98-533) and the 1986 Omnibus Diplomatic Security and 
Antiterrorism Act (PL 99-399), among other legislation, that the criminal justice system would 
prove a major part of U.S. counterterrorism strategy.   
After the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, the U.S. was on heightened alert and 
was tipped off to a terrorist plot that was said to be a “war of urban terrorism.”
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  The plot 
included the detonation of bombs across five New York City landmarks: the United Nations 
building, the Lincoln and Holland Tunnels, the George Washington Bridge, and the Federal 
Building in Manhattan.  Federal and local officials devoted extraordinary law enforcement 
efforts to the investigation and apprehension of the conspirators of the attack.  In 1996, after a 
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lengthy FBI investigation and an eight month trial, a Federal court sentenced Sheik Omar Abdel 
Rahman to life in prison and imposed no less than 25 years each for nine of his followers.
33
   
 This serves as one example among many of the use of the criminal justice system to 
combat terrorism, in both preventive and punitive ways.  The World Trade Center bombing trial 
was the largest ever in an American courtroom including over 200 witnesses, over 1,000 
exhibits, and five months of testimony, resulting in seven convictions (Crona and Richardson 
1996, Norman 2013).   Despite the relative successes in terms of convictions with these two 
cases, there were many skeptics of the effectiveness of investigatory and prosecutorial measures 
in combatting actual terrorism, especially as terrorism became more political and violent in late 
90s.  Many worried that the “due process” model arbitrarily doled out punishment for 
unspeakable acts and was too often impeded upon by the notion of reasonable doubt which 
required revealing sources and support networks and methods of planning and execution to 
standards of which were “much greater than that of an ordinary criminal trial (McCullough and 
Pickerson 2009).”  Moving into the 2000s, the U.S. had already grown tiresome of the burden of 
due process and commitment to international human rights law that was seemingly inhibiting the 
state’s ability to effectively combat terrorism.   
Military Model 
Conventional wisdom suggests that out of the fatigue with the liberal commitments of the 
criminal justice model, spawned a shift in focus in counterterrorism strategy toward the military 
model.  That the military model treats terrorism as an act of war suggests several contrary 
axioms to that of the criminal justice model. 
Axiom 1.  In the military model, terrorism is an act of war.  Where the criminal justice 
model views terrorism as a crime subject to the laws and regulations of the criminal legal system, 
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the military model views terrorism as an act of war subject to the laws of war and rules of 
engagement for armed conflict.  From this viewpoint, it is the obligation of the military to protect 
the nation’s security using displays of maximal force including, but not limited to, retaliatory 
strikes, troop deployment, and campaigns of retribution just as would be elicited in times of 
conventional war (Chalk 1998).  When terrorism is viewed as an act of war, it not only 
necessitates a military response, but also requires the labeling of suspected terrorists as enemy 
combatants whose fate rests in the confines of combatant treatment as defined in the laws of war.   
Axiom 2.  The military model relies on military rules of engagement to preempt, prevent, 
and retaliate against terrorism.  Crelinsten (2002) suggests that if the security of the entire nation 
is threatened, rather than a small portion of subset of the population, much like in times of war, 
the state is more likely resort to the rules of war in order to protect its citizens.  In this model, the 
state forgoes, or at least relaxes, its commitment to due process and follows procedures outlined 
in the military rules of engagement in order preempt, prevent, detain, and punish suspected 
terrorists.  The state goes beyond traditional rule of law and defines its fight against terrorism in 
terms of combatants, maximal force, and war subjecting terrorists to the laws of war rather than 
the guarantee of due process and other civil liberties. 
Axiom 3. State has monopoly and discretion on the use of violence.  If the criminal 
justice model seeks to restrain state use of violence by relying on the criminal legal system to 
provide justice, the military model, its conceptual opposite, must seek to maximize state use of 
force in so far as it effectively accomplishes its goal of combatting and preventing terrorism.  In 
the past, the state has been defined by its “claims to the monopoly of legitimate use of physical 
force within a given territory,” a definition which is further supported by Article 2 Section 7 of 




of domestic affairs, whether or not to respond to acts of aggression with violence.  The military 
model of counterterrorism assumes that this right extends to the combat and prevention of 
terrorist events.   
From these axioms several assumptions may be derived about the relationship of the 
military model of counterterrorism to certain political processes and to terrorism, broadly 
speaking.   
Assumption 1a.  In states where the military may be deployed domestically, the military 
model is a suitable response for both domestic and transnational terrorism. 
Assumption 1b.  In states where the military cannot be deployed domestically, the 
military model is not applicable to domestic terrorism but is a suitable response for transnational 
terrorism.   
These assumptions rely on the legally defined parameters of military deployment at the 
domestic level.  If a state may deploy its military internally, for example Israel or South Africa, 
then we might assume the military model may be used for counterterrorism measures against 
domestic terrorism.  However, if a state, such as the United States, is prohibited from deploying 
its military domestically except under extraordinary and unprecedented circumstance, it does not 
make sense to conclude that the military model will be used to combat domestic terrorism, but it 
does not preclude such a state from using the military model to combat transnational terrorism.   
Assumption 2.  Use of the military model implies a direct effect on actual military 
spending.  The military model requires the use of force by the military in response to terrorist 
events, planned or executed, which necessarily suggests an increase in actual military activity.  If 
military activity is increasing and emphasis is placed on counterterrorism measures that involve 




military response to terrorism.  Defense economics literature suggests the best evidence we have 
of increased military activity is real defense spending, which is particularly likely to respond to 
instances of transnational threat, such as terrorism (Gupta et al., 2004, Sandler and Hartley 
2007).     
Assumption 3.  Public opinion affects the decision to use and to continue to use the 
military model.  This is an assumption is derived from empirical research rather than a given 
axiom.  Empirical public policy research has demonstrated a link between public opinion and 
military spending; if the public believes the military overactive, or spending too much, decision-
makers respond by decreasing military activity and actual defense dollars spent.  Public opinion 
in the area of defense spending has exhibited a long history of fluctuation based on changing 
political environments, and especially, on the occurrence of dramatic political events such as 
militarized conflict, war, and terrorism (Converse 1987, Hartley and Russett 1992, Ladd 2007).  
Public policy literature makes clear that a “high proportion of variance of the annual rate of 
change of U.S. defense outlays” can be explained by public opinion (Higgs and Kilduff 1993).  
To this effect, previous research has demonstrated the role of public opinion in changes in 
defense spending following the Vietnam War, the Cold War, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, 
the attacks of September 11, and the War in Iraq to name a few, showing that a preference for 
decline or increase in defense spending led to actual decreases or increases in defense spending 
respectively (Wittkopf 1990, Bartels 1994, Hartley and Russett 1992, Birkland 2006, Voeten and 
Brewer 2006).  Therefore, we should expect that dramatic events such as terrorist attacks play a 
role in shifting public preferences on defense spending and that the signals sent by the public 





The rationale behind the claim that trends in defense spending follow changes in public 
opinion are derived from the theoretical and statistical claims that policy outputs internalize 
feedback on public inputs and adjust accordingly (Pierson 1993).  This claim is particularly 
relevant for counterterrorism models because policy preferences are more likely to change in 
response to dramatic political events, such as terrorist attacks, and the resulting signals may be 
strong enough to pressure change in the existing policy climate (Page and Shapiro 1983, Bartels 
1992, Birkland 2006).   
Assumption 4.  The military model was rarely used before September 11, 2001, and has 
since become the more dominant response strategy.  Prior to September 11, the military 
detention framework remained under great scrutiny from policy makers, the American public, 
and the international community.  Many believed that the standards of international human rights 
law should apply during armed conflict, let alone, in the apprehension of ‘non-combatant’ 
individuals suspected of committing crimes associated with terrorism (Chesney and Goldsmith 
2008). In particular, decision-makers and critics referenced the Additional Protocols (AP) I and 
II of the Geneva Conventions which restricts indiscriminate violence against and guarantees the 
humane treatment and legal protection of all persons who take part in hostilities but are exempt 
from POW status as defined in Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention.
3435
  Though the U.S. 
did not ratify AP I and II, human rights considerations associated with these amendments 
severely constrained the use of force and application of the laws of war in response to terrorism 
during the pre-9/11 period. 
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 These individuals are generally exempt from POW status because they intentionally do not distinguish themselves 
from the civilian population, and purposefully refrain from activities, apart from coordinated attacks, that would 
irrefutably result in their classification as EPW (Chesney and Goldsmith 2008).  
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 However, by the end of the 90s, decision-makers and the general public began to doubt 
the effectiveness of criminal justice measures in anti-terrorism efforts.  Many worried that the 
punishments did match the crime and that suspected terrorists were “being punished about as 
severely as an ordinary robber or a drug pusher up for his “third strike” (Crona and Richardson 
1996).”  After the attacks on September 11, the U.S. declared a “Global War on Terror,” 
denoting the abstract “terrorism” as the prime enemy, whose associates and conspirators must be 
“eliminated” and “destroyed.”
36
  The rhetoric switched from terrorism as a criminal act to 
terrorism as an act of war, while government practice moved from trying individuals for crimes 
associated with terrorism, to all out warfare against the named enemy.  From this verbal 
declaration of war against terrorism, the Bush Administration also asserted its right to armed 
self-defense, to detain any “unlawful combatant” suspected of terrorism or conspiracy, and the 
renouncement of any applicability of the laws of war outlined in the Geneva Conventions (Paust 
2003).
37
  Collectively, the Bush and Obama administrations executed more military 
deployments, covert operations, and drone strikes in the name of combatting terrorism than had 
been reported in the last two decades combined.  While the Obama administration, shifted 
rhetoric “reconstructing the war on terror,” speaking to the restoration of due process and other 
constitutional guarantees, his conduct suggested continued faith in the military model with 
additional troop deployments, 506 reported drone strikes, and revealed covert operations 
(McCrisken 2011, Zenko 2016).  
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 The Administration later announced in 2002 that Geneva Conventions would apply to war against the Taliban, but 
maintained that non-governmental actors and even individual members of the Taliban associated with terrorism 




Presentation of Hypotheses 
The following preliminary hypotheses focus mainly on the military model of 
counterterrorism, which is the model that is tested quantitatively.  However, the assumption of 
the both the criminal justice and military models presume that the United States uses the criminal 
justice model as its primary response to terrorism.  Essentially, both models rest on the 
underlying assumption that liberal democracies will use the criminal justice system, in order to 
preserve democratic principles, whenever possible.  If that be the case, we can expect the 
relationship between terrorism and military spending to be insignificant. 
H1: There is no significant relationship between terrorism and military spending.  
The assumptions of the military model offer several testable propositions.  First, the 
military model suggests that after a terrorist attack occurs, a military response is offered, 
consequently increasing military spending for that fiscal year.   
H2: Terrorism has a direct positive effect on military spending.  An increase in the supply of 
terrorism will lead to an increase in military spending.   
Second, the military model posits a complex relationship between terrorism, public 
mood, and military response (evidenced by military spending).  Terrorism spikes public mood, 
whether it be fear, anxiety, worry, anger, patriotism, or otherwise, causing an increased desire for 
military action.  As a result, policy makers must consider and acquiesce to public demands for a 
military response, thereby increasing military spending.   
H3: Terrorism indirectly affects military spending through its impact on public mood.   
A change in public preference for defense spending should reflect a change in both the 
preferred levels of spending and the actual spending decisions of policymakers.  Namely, an 




pressure on the defense budget, just as declining demand for military spending will produce a 
downward pressure on the defense budget, but will do so at lagged intervals (Bartels 1992, Higgs 
and Kilduff 1993, Wlezien 1995).  
Hypothesis three is, in a way, linked to hypothesis two in that terrorism is thought to 
affect military activity both directly and indirectly, through its direct impact on public opinion. 
This complex relationship is depicted in figure 1.  
 
Figure 1. Interdependence between Terrorism, Military Activity and Public Opinion 
In the military model, terrorism evokes a military response from the government.  In addition, a 
terrorist event incites adverse sentiment in the public, who in turn signal to policy makers their 
desire for a forceful response.  Consequently, military activity increases as an indirect result of 
terrorism.  The indirect effects become a bit more complicated over time as the public wavers on 
its approval of actual military spending.  In general, we would expect the public to desire more 
military activity immediately following a terrorist event, but over time, the public will eventually 
disapprove of the excess spending, resulting in a lagged decrease in actual spending.  In short, I 
expect an initial spike in the relationship between public opinion and military spending with the 
effect decreasing over time.   
H4: Displays of military force deter terrorism, therefore an increase in military activity, 




This hypothesis rests on the assumption that the military model effectively combats terrorism.   
Conclusions 
This chapter lays out an operational theory of the criminal justice and military models.  
By building a theory from the conceptual models laid out in the existing literature, I was able to 
derive several assumptions which led to several hypotheses about the relationship between 
terrorism and the military. The major contribution of these hypotheses is the presumption of 
direct and indirect effects of terrorism on the military model, measure through military spending.  
According to the military model of counterterrorism, a terrorist attack should trigger a military 
response, thereby increasing military spending, demonstrating the direct effects of terrorism on 
military activity.  In addition, military spending is greatly influenced by public opinion and 
public opinion is influenced by dramatic events like terrorism, demonstrating that terrorism 




Chapter 4: Vector Autoregressive Analysis of the Military Model of Counterterrorism 
Ideally the postulated hypotheses about the relationship between military spending and terrorism 
(direct and mediated by public mood) would be tested using standard OLS regression implying a 
linear relationship where the effects of terrorism and public mood on military expenditures are 
both significant, yet independent of one another as demonstrated in the equation below. 
  
Because I hypothesize direct and indirect effects and potential for interdependence among 
variables, typical linear models, which impose strict assumptions for independence and 
exogeneity, cannot be used.  Instead, the analytical tool employed must be able to flexibly model 
the complex interdependence proposed to exist among the variables within the system.   
The Vector Autoregressive Model 
Vector autoregression (VAR) is an econometric tool used to analyze multivariate time 
series in which the dynamic behavior of an individual component of a system is assumed to be a 
product of its own past behavior as well as of the current and past behaviors of other components 
within the system.  It is predominantly used for financial and economic time series and forecast, 
but can also be used to perform structural and policy analysis (Zivot and Wang 2006). VAR has 
been introduced to mainstream terrorism studies through the works of Todd Sandler and Walter 
Enders (see Enders and Sandler 1993, 2000 and Enders, Sandler, and Gaubulloev 2011) and Zvi 
Eckstein and Daniel Tsiddon (2004). 
 The VAR model is a special derivative of the autodistributed lag model (ADL) and is a 
sophisticated variant of the standard time series.  However, unlike the standard time series and 




by allowing for non-stationarity, or temporal and spatial evolution of multiple variables (Enders 
and Sandler 1993, Toda and Phillips 1994, Phillips 1995). It investigates structural hypotheses, 
based on a priori assumptions about the existence of dependence between variables, often not 
testable using conventional statistical methods.  Recalling figure one from chapter 3, the a priori 
assumption of the military model is that terrorism impacts military activity both directly and 
indirectly through public opinion, but also that military activity impacts future supply of 
terrorism.  Unlike linear, ADL, and standard time series models, VAR not only assumes the 
“interdependence and contingency” of one variable on the others, it also can test these 
assumptions for validity (Stepanova 2003; Enders and Sandler 1993, Zivot and Wang 2006).  
  The VAR model has several characteristics that make it well suited for this study. First, it 
allows us to avoid "incredible identification restrictions" that many similar econometric models 
employ, this allows for the data to speak for itself without any restrictions (Simms 1980, Granato 
and Krause 2000). Second, it allows us to account for the complex interdependence that exists 
within a dynamic system.  Dependence among observations complicates research in IR studies; 
for this reason it is “critical to our methodological analyses” though “ignored by many previous 
researchers (King 2001).”  In the case of studies in government response and other questions 
relevant to single country studies of national defense and defense economics, the independent 
variables of interest are highly interconnected.  Third, VAR allows us to work with reduced 
structural form making it easier to identify and analyze the relationship between variables of 
interest rather than being forced to deal with the constraints of controlling for potential controls 
or other independent variables.  Specifically, VAR lessens the restrictive assumptions necessary 




VAR aids in the analysis of variables that are spatially and temporally dependent; where 
variables are a linear function of past observations as well as of the past observations of other 
variables in the model.  Meaning, in a dynamic system, present and future observations are a 
function of or are dependent on observations in the past.  Because of this dependence, VAR is 
necessarily a tool for multivariate time series, where each variable has its own time series 
equation and each time lag has its own place in the right hand side of these equations, meaning 
the lags are included in the model as predictors.  To test for causal linkages, the following VAR 
model is expressed: 
 
Take the matrix form three variable VAR equation below   
 




 is the conventional lag operator 
supplemented for the reduced form equation (Granato and Krause 2000).   
Though the estimates of the vectors in a VAR stationary series are asymptotically 
unbiased, consistent, and efficient, variables are assumed to be interdependent, they are also 
likely to be highly collinear, resulting in large standard errors and small t-ratios (Hahn and 
Kuersteiner 2002, Shellman 2004).  For this reason, we cannot rely on conventional hypothesis 
tests and interpretational tools. Instead, VAR has its own interpretational toolkit to aid in its 
analysis, including granger causality, impulse response function, and forecast error variance 
decomposition. 
Granger causality is a type of hypothesis test used for determining whether one series is 




variables in the system and then uses F-tests, omitting blocks of lags, to determine the causal 
direction of relationships between variables (Hoover 2001).  Take for example the following 
restricted equation in which previous value yt-1 predicts the current value yt 
 
Now consider this unrestricted equation in which the past value of a second variable 𝑦2𝑡−1 are 
also presumed to predict current values of yt 
 
 
The F-tests will test restricted models, in which the lags (L) are omitted one at time, against the 
full model, which includes all lags in the function.  The F-test then compares the sum of squared 






If the specified test statistic, in this case F1,is greater than the critical F value, given as  
 
then we can reject the null hypothesis that 𝑦2𝑡  does not Granger-cause yt.  Substantively, this 
means that the addition of 𝑦2𝑡 in the previous period significantly improves the models predictive 
capabilities, thus concluding that 𝑦2𝑡  Granger-causes yt.  We can also use this test to verify that 
the reverse is true, that yt does not Granger-cause 𝑦2𝑡 .  This is important because if both yt  and 




the causality and needs to be controlled for.  It is also important to remember that Granger 
causality does not test for contemporaneous effects, meaning it cannot identify instantaneous 
causality (causality that occurs within the same time period nor does it allow for identification of 
the direction of causality).   
 The impulse response function (IRF) describes the moving average representation of a 
stationary process and traces the dynamic effects of shock on variables endogenous to a system 




then the following expresses a moving average representation of yt. 
 
The impulse response function is thusly expressed 
 
serving as a compliment to the Granger causality test in that it tells us the impulse relationship 
between two variables over time in a dynamic system.  Namely, the IRF tells us how one 
variable reacts to the impulse, or shock, of another variable, a reaction which may be deemed as 




does not affect the output at time t-2).  Each response includes the effect of a specific shock on 
one of the variables in the system at impact t, then at t+1 all the way to t+p.   
The forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD) also describes a moving average 
representation of a stationary process, but instead of tracing the shock, it forecasts errors and 
relationships among variables and explains the proportion of the movements of a variable due to 
shocks from itself and shocks from other variables.  The FEVD uses regressions to forecast the 
effects of each variable on the other over a time horizon h.  The forecast error variance at h is: 
 
where the expected value of yt is denoted by E(yt) and the forecast error variances are simply the 
squares of the forecast errors:  
 
where θi(h) is the forecast error variance of variable i at horizon h.  The error variance 
decomposition quantifies the proportion of variance for which each shock is responsible and is 
equal to the fraction of forecast error variance of each variable due to shock at each horizon 
(Sims 2016).   
 
The variance decomposition then is equal to the forecast error variance of variable i due to shock 
j at time horizon h, denoted φih(h), divided by the total forecast error variance (Phillips 1998).  




linearly with the time horizon, because there will be more uncertainty the further out we forecast, 
until it eventually begins to converge (Plasmans 2006).   
Data and Measurement 
 The data used to measure terrorist events is drawn from the Global Terrorism Database 
(GTD) which contains records of numerous types of events and covers the years from 1970 to 
2014. The database has documented well over 140,000 terror related events worldwide and is 
considered to be one of the most accurate sources for both domestic and transnational terror 
events available (Sheehan 2012, LaFree, Dugan, and Miller 2015). It is maintained by the 
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism (START) that is 
hosted at the University of Maryland in conjunction with the Department of Homeland Security. 
Most importantly the GTD database contains variables that account for the number of injuries, 
number of attacks, and number of fatalities associated with each event within each country. For 
this reason, GTD has proven itself invaluable in studies of terrorism and, more importantly to 
this study, has been used in several influential studies that focus on transnational terrorisms and 
its impact on economic factors (Sandler and Enders 2004, Enders, Saschida, and Sandler 2006, 
Enders, Sandler and Gaibulloev 2011; Enders and Hoover 2012).  It is important to note that loss 
of the 1993 data by the GTD.  In order to recover the lost data, I coded all transnational attacks 
from the United States Department of State Global Report on Terrorism 1993, using the same 
coding scheme as the GTD.  From this report I recorded the number of U.S. citizens wounded 
and killed in a transnational terrorist attack, and the total number of transnational attacks 
involving the U.S. in that year.  I crossed checked the totals with the FBI Report on Terrorism 




Over the 45 year time period included in this data set, the United States experienced a 
total of 829 transnational terror events that targeted US citizens across the globe, which averages 
around eighteen events per year.   Of course there were some years when less attacks occurred, 
as well as years where more than eighteen events occurred.  The highest number of transnational 
attacks in a given year was 54. 
 
Table 1.Summary Statistics 
 
Terror Index.  Many studies consider only the frequency of attacks or the number of fatalities, 
but rarely both when performing research of the impact of terrorism.  For this study, it is 
important to not only identify the number of attacks, but also to identify the varying intensities of 
those attacks as higher intensity attacks are likely to elicit a higher index of government 
response.  That is not to say that low intensity attacks do not render an impact as in some cases 
the infliction of fear alone is enough to call the government to action, however the response to an 
event that has no injuries or no casualties is expected to be less severe than a more destructive 
attack.  To capture the intensity of terrorism many approaches have been used; mainly the 
number of events, the number of injuries, and the number of casualties. It is from this idea that 
the measure of terror intensity is conceptualized. This measurement was first used by Eckstein 




The terrorism index variable is the natural log of e, to counteract zeros in the data set, plus the 
equally weighted sum of the number of attacks (a), the number of injuries (i), and the number of 
casualties (k). 
ln(𝑒 + (
𝑎 + 𝑖 + 𝑘
3
)) 
This terror index “captures the flow of terror activity”, which has the benefit of incorporating 
intensity and frequency of terrorism into the measurement (Eckstein and Tsiddon 2004). The 
higher the index, the greater the intensity of the attack.  
 
 





Military expenditures per capita (first difference). Expenditure data for the U.S. comes from the 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) military expenditures dataset spanning 
1970-2014 and are the real dollars spent, per capita.  The primary reason for using the SIPRI 
dataset as opposed to the U.S. operated Green Book data is that SIPRI more readily allows for 
expanding the empirical research to other nations, nevertheless the yearly observations are 
identical.  While there is no consensus among scholars on the most effective way to capture the 
government’s reaction in attempt to respond to and to prevent terrorist activity, I argue for the 
use of military expenditure as an indicator of government response (Murdoch and Sandler 1984, 
Sandler and Hartley 1995, Abu-Bader and Abu-Qarn 2003).  While military expenditure is not 
the perfect indicator of response to terror alone, as portions of the defense and expenditure 
budgets go to assist other programs and areas of defense, it is the most theoretically logical 
indicator of government response considering the exponential increase in yearly expenditures 
following 9/11 (peaking in 2010 at over $711 billion), and that each National Security Strategy 
and declassified National Military Strategy document has stressed the military priority of 
bolstering counterterrorism efforts and eradicating terrorists, their threats and their attacks.
38
  In 
addition, the defense economics literature suggests that military expenditure is best way to 
measure military activity, productivity, and national strength and that the military’s primary duty 
is to promote national security which terror acts seek to threaten (Hartley and Sandler 1995).   
With regard to the budget request processes and resulting expenditure outcomes, the 
government and policymakers, after experiencing a transnational attack, are expected to respond 
in a manner that would ensure the public that they are being protected in order to reduce fear and 
to allow for maneuverability in the response to current attacks and prevention of future ones. 
                                                 
38
 While I was unable to acquire National Military Strategy doctrines before the 1990s, it is worthwhile to note that 
in the documents prior to 2004, the focus was on “transnational dangers,” which groups counterdrug, 




This allows for policies to be passed to prevent such occurrences from taking place, one such 
policy outcome is an increase in military spending to thwart terrorist activities. While it may be 
argued that the military budget does little to prevent attacks within the United States, the military 
can and does play a vital role in preventing terrorism before it occurs and that role has only 
grown larger in the post 9/11 environment. If the frequency of terrorist attacks increases, or the 
intensity of attacks becomes greater, this can lead to a “growing public pressure on the 
government to take further military measures to fight terrorism” (Feridun and Shahbaz 2009).   
By focusing on the government response via policy change in the form of military 
expenditures, I am able to insert this research in between the terrorism and defense economics 
literature. I analyze the first differenced military expenditures per capita.  Differencing is a 
calculus procedure which, in time series, examines the difference of successive values of yt over 
successive values of xt,. While an argument may be made to use the logged per capita 
expenditures, I follow precedent of several studies which employ the first differenced per capita 
expenditures, as well as first differenced per capita GDP (See Cusack and Ward 1981, Brauer 
and Hartley 2013, Das et al., 2015).  While Sims (1980) and Sims, Stock, and Watson (1990) 
recommend against first differencing arguing that the goal of the VAR analysis is to determine 
the interrelationship among variables, not to determine the parameter estimate, Patrick Brandt 
and John Williams (2006) argue that differenced-stationary series should be treated as such if we 
are to render our test results as asymptotically valid, and that short term dynamics and 
exogeneity analyses are the main focus.  Brandt and Williams views are echoed by Dickey, Bell, 
and Miller (1986), Cochrane (1991), Breitung and Pesaran (2008), and have been applied in 




Freeman et al., (1989), DeBoef and Keele (2008), Brauer and Hartley (2013).  The raw 
expenditures and first differenced per capita expenditures over time can be seen in figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3. Trend in Raw Military Expenditures from 1970-2014 and in First Differenced Per Capita Expenditures 
 
Public opinion. Previous political science research has shown public sentiment to be a good 
indicator of future levels of defense and military spending (Hartley and Russett 1992, Wlezien 
1995, Burstein 2003).  Whether or not the public feels the government spending too little, too 
much, or just enough on national defense and military readiness and operations has statistical 
impact on future defense budget requests and, consequentially, actual military spending (Knopf 




Project Public Moods dataset,
39
 which covers all but four noncontiguous years of the time frame 
of this analysis, for which those four years the missing data was imputed.
40
  Respondents of the 
survey were asked, “There is much discussion as to the amount of money the government in 
Washington should spend for national defense and military purposes. How do you feel about 
this: do you think we are spending too little, too much or about the right amount?”  The 
aggregate mood data theoretically ranges from 1-100, where 1 represents all respondents believe 
the government is spending too little (should spend more), 100 represents all respondents believe 
the government is spending too much (should spend less), and a middling response signifies 
belief that the current spending is just about right.  Actual annual measures of public mood in 
this study range from 6.4 to 78.2.    
Interstate conflict.  The existence of ongoing armed conflict may factor into past and current 
levels of military spending.  Using the Correlates of War MIDs dataset, I included a Militarized 
Interstate Dispute variable as an exogenous predictor.  This variable, coded annually, accounts 
for disputes that the U.S. was involved in that had more than 25 fatalities which are coded as 1, 
and any years with less than 25 fatalities or no involvement in militarized interstate disputes are 
coded as 0 (Wallensteen and Sollenberg 1998, Gleditsch et al., 2002). 
Incumbent administration.  Both theory and expenditure data suggest that the two major political 
parties have differing agendas with regard to defense spending and military activity.  Political 
science research suggests that while both the executive and the legislative branches are in charge 
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 The data used here were originally collected by Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones, with the support of 
National Science Foundation grant numbers SBR 9320922 and 0111611, and are distributed through the Department 
of Government at the University of Texas at Austin. Neither NSF nor the original collectors of the data bear any 
responsibility for the analysis reported here. 
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 Since this study uses aggregate public opinion data it is appropriate to impute the missing data for the four years 
in which the Policy Agendas Project did not supply a measure for public sentiment on defense spending (Groves and 




of final decision making for military spending, the president is in charge of proposing the initial 
budget from which all alterations stem and public opinion on military spending may be filtered 
through public support for the president (Nincic and Cusack 1979, Delucchi and Murphy 2008) 
To control for this factor, I included an exogenous predictor coded as 0 if the democratic party is 
in control of the executive office and as 1 if the republican party controls the executive office.   
Operation Enduring Freedom.  Research suggests that the attacks on September 11 may have 
changed the paradigm of government responses to terrorism away from criminal justice 
responses in favor of increased military activity.  To examine the possible effects of 9/11 on 
military expenditures, I include an exogenous control variable coded as 0 for years 1970-2001 
and 1 for 2002-2014.
41
  
Analysis and Discussion 
To choose an appropriate lag length, the VAR select function was used and the Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC) and Schwarz criterion (SBIC) were considered and the results are 
shown in table 2.  Both the AIC and SBIC results arrived at the same appropriate lag length of 
one year.  The resulting lag suggestion makes substantive sense due to the delayed effects 
regarding budgetary decisions, appropriation, and implementation.  In addition, Dickey Fuller 
test, displayed in table 3, did not indicate unit root presence; therefore all variables included 
across both models are analyzed as trend-stationary series. 
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 Although the attacks occurred in 2001, the coding does not change to 1 until 2002 because it was not until 2002 





Table 2. VAR Select: AIC and BIC Results 
 
Table 3. Augmented Dickey Fuller Test 
 
Initial granger causality tests suggest that current and past values of terrorism may 
forecast future values of military spending; the results are shown in table 4.  However the 
granger test cannot say, with confidence, that current and past values of military expenditures are 
good predictors of future terrorism flows in the U.S.  These results confirm Feridun and Shabaz’s 
(2010) assertion that unidirectional causality signifies the inability of military use of force to 
combat terrorism on its own.  It also alleviates suspicion of the role of a third variable in 
influencing the direct relationship between terrorism and expenditures.  The results also confirm 
that public mood on defense spending is a good indicator of future values of military spending, 
but public mood may not be influenced by past terrorist incidences or military spending.  
However, the granger results cannot determine whether public opinion is instantaneously 
affected by terrorist events.  Overall, the test results confirm that the flow of terrorism and public 





Table 4. Granger Causality Results 
 
The VAR model further supports the granger causality results, showing that on average 
from 1971-2014, military spending in response to transnational terror is statistically significant 
for the first temporal lag, as well as the second. This shows that an increase in terrorism activity 
and intensity does indeed influence military expenditures, and, more specifically, this influence 
persists for multiple years. While the first lag was expected to be influential due to budget cycles 
that may delay governmental responses, that the second lag is also significant suggests that the 
effects of terrorism may persist beyond the initial year in which the event took place.  I expected 
the significance to persist due to the nature of government spending which is delayed by 
Congress, budget constraints, and audience costs among other things, and to the persistent nature 
of military spending in particular (Smith and Dunne 2010).  
To aid in the analysis of the effect of transnational terrorism on military expenditures, an 
Impulse Response Function (IRF) is used.  The IRF is useful to “study shock-induced” events 
like terrorism (Enders, Sandler, and Gailbulloev 2011). The solid line in Figure 3 represents the 
military spending impulse response and the gray shading represent 95 percent confidence 




when a one standard deviation shock of the terror index is introduced into the system the 
resulting effect is an increase in military expenditures.  The IRF analysis also suggests when one 
standard deviation of the terrorism index is introduced, its effect on military spending becomes 
significant the year after and the general patterns of spending do not return to their ‘pre-shock’ 
levels until around six years later. 
 
Figure 4. IRF results of Military Expenditures Shocked by Terrorism 
 
Although I could have observed from the data a correlation between terrorist attacks and 
military expenditures, the results of this analysis demonstrate the effects of the shock of the 
terror index is not only increasing military expenditures, but also that it persists for several years.  
While these results signify the average relationship between terror and military spending across 
all events from 1971-2014, it still demonstrates the existence of a statistically significant and 
persistent effect of the flow of terror on military expenditures for over four years. The longevity 
of persistence is unexpected but is a good indicator that terrorist events have a much longer 




Another useful feature of the VAR model is the ability to analyze forecast error variance 
decomposition of the variable of interest. It can be used to “determine the impact of one 
variables forecast error on the error in forecasting other variables. Thus we can measure the 
effects that variables have on each other over time (Freeman et al., 1989).”  The forecast error 
variance decomposition confirms that the effect of terrorism plateaus in around year six with 
18.6 per cent variance explained before beginning to converge.  Substantively, this suggests that 
the introduction of terrorism can explain up to 18.6 per cent of the annual change in military 
expenditures over time.   
 
Table 5. FEVD of Military Expenditures to Terrorism 
 
Comparing the results of IRF when public opinion is shocked by terrorism to the results 
of the granger causality test, I correct in my prediction of contemporaneous causality.  Recall the 
granger causality test were inconclusive for the effects of terrorism on public opinion, but the 
IRF results confirm that this is because the effects of terrorism on public opinion are 






Figure 5. IRF Results of Mood Shocked by Terrorism 
 
The FEVD confirms that the effects of terrorism converge at t + 2, explaining up to eight per 
cent variation in public opinion. 
 
Table 6. FEVD of Public Opinion to Terrorism 
 
The model also demonstrates the strong impact of public mood on military expenditures 
but only after the first year.  The second year lag proved insignificant substantively signifying 




This is to be expected as both the general public and policy makers remember the distant past 
less clearly making it unlikely for Congress to use public opinion measures from the several 
years back to justify current spending or future spending requests (Carey 1995, Shiller 2002). 
The IRF and FEVD results, shown in figure 4 and table 6 respectively, show public mood 
explains up ten per cent variation in military expenditures over a ten year forecast.   
 
 









The final IRF and FEVD (table 8 and figure 7) tests hypothesis four; that an increase in 
military activity should lead to a decrease in future supplies of terrorism.  The results do not 
support this claim, rather, they suggest the possibility that heightened military activity may 
increase terrorism across a shorter horizon.  The IRF shows an increase in the levels of terrorism 
from t to t + 1 before the decline to pre-shock levels around t + 2.  The FEVD shows military 
expenditures explaining up to eleven percent variation in terrorism flows, but since the 
confidence intervals contain zero, ideally more evidence is needed to make solid assertions about 
the relationship between the two.   
 
 







Table 8. FEVD of Terrorism to Military Expenditures 
 
The party exogenous controls were significant, while the control for MIDs and 
September 11 attacks were not.  This suggests that both the party which holds executive office 
contributes more information regarding future levels of military spending than does existing 
armed conflict or the September 11 attacks in 2001.  While September 11 was a truly devastating 
day U.S. history, 2001 comes second highest in level of terror index to 1998, which saw two 
embassy attacks wounding more than 4,000 people.  Substantively, the structure of the data 
regarding terrorism’s effect on military spending has remained consistent over time, which calls 
into question the validity of the literature’s claim that the military was not really used in response 
to terrorism before 9/11.  As the post- 9/11 observations in the control variable only account for 
about one quarter of the annual observations in our analysis, it does not have the type of leverage 
over the statistical results that one might assume given the amount of policy change as a result of 
these attacks.  This means, that despite any conventional thoughts about the magnitude of change 





Overall, the results demonstrate both consistencies and inconsistencies with the 
hypotheses.  First, hypothesis one, that there is not significant relationship between terrorism and 
military activity, is not confirmed by the results.  In fact, the granger causality, VAR, IRF, and 
FEVD results all suggest that terrorism is a good indicator of future values of military spending.  
These results confirm hypothesis two, that terrorism has a direct effect on military spending.  
The granger causality confirms that terrorism granger causes military expenditures, the IRF 
shows that terrorism causes an increase in military expenditures, reaching a maximum in periods 
2-3, and the FEVD shows terrorism explains 18 percent variation in military expenditures before 
convergence around year six.  Hypothesis three tests two propositions: (1) terrorism causes an 
increase in public opinion, signaling the desire for higher defense spending, and (2) a decrease 
(meaning the government should spend more) in public opinion measures causes an increase in 
military expenditures.  The results confirm both propositions and suggest that terrorism 
indirectly impacts military expenditures through public mood, but the effects are 
contemporaneous or have short horizons.  The fourth hypothesis speaks to the effectiveness of 
the military model; if the military model works, then increases in military activity should lead to 
future decreases in terrorism.  While more evidence is necessary to increase our confidence 
levels, the preliminary tests suggest that increases in military activity may actually increase, at 
least contemporaneously, the supply of terrorism.    
Implications 
 
The results of this research suggest that terrorism has both direct and indirect effects on 
military activity.  The impact of terrorism on military spending is more than immediate. It is 
lasting, even though budget cycles may affect the temporal realm in which military expenditures 




indicate that terrorism positively affects military expenditures independent of other ongoing 
militarized conflicts and operations that the U.S. may be engaged in.  Terrorism also directly 
impacts public opinion, calling for an immediate increase in military spending.  However, 
because of the way budget cycles are structured, the increases in actual dollar spent, when 
affected by public opinion, do not occur right away, but instead occur a period or two into the 
forecast horizon precisely because actual dollars spent on military operations is directly related 
to proposed budgets of the preceding fiscal year.   
   The results also suggest that the existing literature may have over emphasized the 
importance of September 11 as a transition point between the criminal justice and military 
models of counterterrorism.  Specifically, the pre-9/11 counterterrorism literature has incorrectly 
under-emphasized the role of the military model, and over emphasized the role of 9/11 in 
counterterrorism response strategy.  The results suggest that 9/11 was not a significant event with 
regard to changes in military activity in response to terrorism.  Instead, the results are consistent 
with the proposition that military activity in response to terrorism has remained relatively 
consistent since 1971 in its variation when shocked with a standard deviation of terrorism, 
suggesting that military action may have always been a dominant counterterrorism strategy in the 
U.S.   
 The assumption of interdependence between terrorism and military expenditures are 
consistent with the results.  As discussed above, terrorism increases military expenditures, but 
the results also suggest the possibility that increase military expenditures might increase 
terrorism contemporaneously.  This finding is consistent with Braithwaite and Li (2007) and 
Azam and Thelen (2010) who posit that increased military capability and expenditures and 




required additional evidence to make a more confident conjecture, these results imply that 
military action alone may not be enough to combat terrorism.  
 The quantitative analysis provided several insights into the military model and 
highlighted several inconsistencies between existing conceptual literature and empirical 
evidence.  Certain aspects of counterterrorism strategy, such as under what conditions the models 
will be employed, currently lack the observational data for empirical investigation and need 
further exploration through qualitative analysis.  In addition, lack of access to criminal justice 
data including organizational and bureaucratic policies and procedures, systematic coding of 
criminal prosecutions, and more, leave much to be explored qualitatively about the criminal 
justice model of counterterrorism.  The next chapter further explores the two models of 
counterterrorism through qualitative investigation and lends a more nuanced depiction of the two 






Chapter 5: Qualitative Analysis of the Counterterrorism Models 
This section of the dissertation presents a qualitative study of U.S. counterterrorism 
models, which serves both as a compliment and a supplement to the quantitative research of the 
previous chapter. The research design for the qualitative analysis is informed by the theoretical 
frameworks of the criminal justice and military models of counterterrorism, which are laid out in 
chapter 3. The purpose of the qualitative research is to systematically investigate the conditions 
under which the models are employed, to what and to whom specific counterterrorism strategies 
will be applied, how strategies have shifted over time, if at all, and to further explore official 
explanations and justifications of counterterrorism policies and procedures.   
Concepts and Definitions 
In order to proceed with the presentation of the results of the qualitative research, I will 
provide operationalizations of several terms that are the primary concepts around which the 
qualitative research was performed.  In the U.S., the concept of terrorism holds many definitions 
across the many actors and agencies responsible for its prevention.  Recall from chapter 1, for the 
purposes of this research, a generic definition of terrorism is used that encompasses the major 
consensual dimensions of the phenomena as conceptualized by the major actors within the field 
of counterterrorism.  Terrorism is defined as the premeditated use or threatened use of violence 
by an individual or group to obtain a political or ideological objective through intimidating or 
inciting fear in a larger audience beyond the immediate victims.  This definition allows for non-
human victims and state sponsored terrorism.  This definition implies that a terrorist is an 
individual or group who wields or threatens to wield violence to intimidate or incite fear in a 
larger audience beyond that of the immediate victims in order to obtain a political or ideological 




Because many Western states do not include a crime of “terrorism” in their criminal 
codes, suspected terrorists are tried for crimes associated with terrorism.  These include violent 
crimes such as murder, solicitation of murder, use of weapon of mass destruction, and malice and 
seditious acts of violence, but include crimes that are non-violent in and of themselves, but 
encourage violence within a greater plan, for example, inciting another person to commit an act 
of terrorism, defrauding banks and creditors, document fraud, conspiracy, terrorist fundraising 
and material support, belonging to a proscribed group, and criminal association to a terrorist 
undertaking.  In the U.S. specifically, terrorist suspects have been tried for many of the 
aforementioned crimes and also possession of bombs, piracy, hijacking, and hostage taking, 
robbery, possession of illegal firearms, hiding evidence, assault, malicious destruction of 
property, transporting explosives, and conspiracy to kill, kidnap, maim, and injure persons or 
damage property to name a few.   
After an attack, or upon learning of a plotted attack, the government may choose to 
respond using law enforcement or military frameworks for investigations, apprehensions, arrests, 
interrogations, detentions, trials, and punishments or sentencing.  When apprehended, terrorist 
suspects may be held in criminal or military detention.  Criminal detention is when a suspect is 
held in the custody of a law enforcement body or is lawfully imprisoned to a particular civilian 
area, usually prisons, police-cells, or other detention centers, where some of that individual’s 
personal liberties have been revoked.  Criminal detention requires that the detaining organization 
identify specific infractions of criminal conduct and provide the defendants with certain rights 
and liberties, including due process (Chesney and Goldsmith 2008).  In certain cases, individuals 
are held off grid or in “black sites,” known as proxy or invisible detentions; these cases are only 




organizations, such as the local police forces, FBI, or CIA (Khalili 2013).  Although the CIA has 
been known to perform paramilitary operations, International Relations and Criminology 
literature generally include the agency as part of a criminal justice response, unless the agency is 
working conjointly with U.S. military forces, as they are still expected to operate within the 
confines of the existing criminal justice system, ultimately bringing terrorism to prosecution in 
criminal court (Crelinsten 1989b, Dripps 2003, Bayley & Weisburd 2011).  If the overseeing 
entities of the detention include military organizations, then the suspects are said to be held in 
military detention.  In the U.S., these types of detainees are typically held at the Naval Station 
Guantanamo Bay, but may also be detained at other military bases both domestically and abroad.  
In addition, there have been some reports of U.S. military forces participating in detentions of 
suspected terrorists at black sites worldwide alongside CIA and FBI, among other law 
enforcement agencies (Khalili 2013, Pugliese 2013).    
 More recently, and especially since 2001, the U.S. has systematically defined terrorists as 
unlawful enemy combatants in order to justify and ensure they receive military detention and 
prosecution.  The term enemy combatant references to the law of armed conflict and should be 
traditionally understood as any citizen of a state in which the U.S. is at war, who are members of 
the armed force of that enemy state, and who are guaranteed protections of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention.  However, in the context of terrorism, “enemy combatants, in the present conflict, 
come from many nations, wear no uniforms, and use unconventional weapons…[they] are not 
defined by simple, readily apparent criteria such as citizenship of military uniform” and are not 
limited to citizens of foreign nations and should not be guaranteed prisoner of war status nor the 
protections of the Geneva Convention (Detention of Enemy Combatants Act (H.R. 1076, 109
th
 




 In 2006, the Bush Administration signed the Military Commissions Act (Pub. Law 109-
366), which established the authority of military commissions to oversee trials for violation of 
laws of war, especially in the case of terrorist activity.  The act authorized military trials for 
unlawful enemy combatants, defined here as 
(i) a person who has engaged in hostilities or who has purposefully and materially 
supported hostilities against the United States or its co-belligerents who is not a 
lawful enemy combatant (including a person who is part of the Taliban, al Qaeda, 
or associated forces); 
 Or,  
(ii) a person who, before, on, or after the date of the enactment of the Military 
Commissions Act of 2006, has been determined to be an unlawful enemy 
combatant by a Combatant Status Review Tribunal or another competent tribunal 
established under the authority of the President or the Secretary of Defense. 
 
As an extension of President Bush’s 2001 Military Order for the Detention, Treatment, 
and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War against Terrorism, the 2006 act effectively 
cemented the ongoing practice of prosecuting suspected terrorists and affiliates in 
military commissions or tribunals.  In both the order and the act, terrorism is viewed as an 
“act of war,” suspects are prosecuted in military courts as “war criminals,” and the 
military commissions are afforded jurisdiction of both martial law and law of war.  
Martial law jurisdiction, though contested, applies here because the Military Order and 
the Commissions Act assert that acts of future terrorism, as acts of war, “may place at 
risk the continuity of the operations of the United States government (Orentlicher and 
Goldman 2001, Bradley 2007).”  In line with this statement, the President gives the 
military judicial authority because the statement implies that future terrorism may inhibit 
the civilian court system from effectively performing its duties.  Law of war jurisdiction 




perpetrator as enemy combatant, in which circumstance, “the Constitution does not 
require trial by jury (Orentlicher and Goldman 2001). Later, the Military Commissions 
Act of 2009 (Pub. Law 111-84), deemed a portion of the 2006 act unconstitutional and 
guaranteed military detainees the right of habeas corpus and the right to access federal 
courts to challenge their detentions.   
 Individuals not receiving prosecution through military tribunal, instead go through 
the federal civilian criminal court system.  Conventional thought maintains that before 
the 9/11 attacks, criminal trials were the first response of the U.S. government when it 
came to prosecuting terrorists and their affiliates, and have since become relegated to 
prosecuting U.S. citizens and domestic terrorists (Chertoff 2011).
42
  Though military and 
criminal tribunals for terrorist prosecutions have both received strong opposition from 
rival cohorts, criminal trials, especially since 2001, have been considered to be 
notoriously lenient in sentencing and wholly ineffective at combating future terrorism 
(Said 2014; Banks, Nevers, and Wallerstein 2008, Macken 2011).   
Take for example the 1994 domestic terrorism case, Apprendi v. New Jersey 
(Docket 99-0478).  The defendant, Charles Apprendi, Jr., opened fire on a Black family 
that had moved into an all-white neighborhood.  Apprendi was arrested, pled guilty to 
three of the twenty-three charges levied against him, and even with the attached hate-
crime enhancement, was sentenced to a maximum of twelve years in prison.  For this 
particular case, the statutory maximum, or the maximum amount of time that could be 
sentenced to Mr. Apprendi, was only ten years, and he received an additional two for the 
hate crime classification made by the presiding judge (Fuchs 2001).  Apprendi appealed 
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 The driving point here is that where prosecutions are concerned, before 9/11, the government elected for criminal 
prosecutions over military tribunals, and after 9/11, it more regularly opted for the latter.  However, this statement 




his sentencing to the New Jersey Supreme Court, where a landmark decision was made to 
prohibit “sentencing enhancing” unless the decision is incorporated into the jury trial, 
upon which “any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed 
statutory minimum must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt (Said 2014).” Apprendi’s 
sentence was deemed unconstitutional and he served five of his ten years before being 
released to a halfway house (Newman 2000).  To this day, Apprendi v. New Jersey is one 
of the most commonly cited cases in the discussion of whether or not terrorism should be 
sentenced as a crime itself or as an aggravating factor (something which increases the 
severity of a crime; Wattad 2006).   
An example of leniency in transnational terrorism sentencing can be seen in the 
case of People v. Reyati.  In 1994, Rashid Baz (Lebanon) shot at a van of 15 Orthodox 
Jewish students on the Brooklyn Bridge, resulting in one fatality and three injuries.  
Bassam Reyati, was Mr. Baz’s uncle and cab driver who both drove him to the scene and 
helped him escape and conceal evidence after the fact.  Mr. Baz received 141 years to life 
in prison, however, for helping him complete his attack, Reyati was sentenced to five 
years of probation and a 1000 dollar fine (Sullivan 1996).  Reyati appealed his conviction 
to the Supreme Court, but was rejected; nonetheless, his role in the attack carried no 
prison sentence.   
In these two cases, and in hundreds more, legal, military, and political officials, as 
well as the U.S. citizens and the international audience, questioned the legitimacy of the 
criminal legal system in prosecuting and sentencing terrorist convictions.  News outlets 
have commented that prosecution in criminal court is the “wrong approach,” reporting in 




released for time served by the time their trials had concluded and sentences were a 
statutory minimum of 20 years in only five cases (Harper 2003, Goldsmith 2010).   
The question of whether or not civilian courts could effectively prosecute and 
punish (sentence) individuals convicted of crimes associated with terrorism, was likely a 
major consideration for then President Bush’s 2001 military order and the 2006 act 
regarding the detention and treatment of suspected terrorists (Beard 2007).  Though these 
documents authorized the post-9/11 transition of terrorist prosecutions from civilian 
courts to military tribunals, including those of some U.S. citizens, civilian courts still try 
cases involving terrorism though not in the same volume as before.     
In addition to detention, court cases, and prosecutions, the government may 
respond to terrorist incidences by operations, interrogations, deployments and other 
activities associated with anti- and counterterrorism.  In order to classify these activities 
as part of the criminal justice or military models of counterterrorism, itmust be clear 
which organization is the primary actor seeing the actions through.  Criminal justice 
actors include any member(s) of law enforcement groups or agencies, including local, 
state, and federal police, federal agencies such as the FBI, CIA, NSA, Department of 
Justice, Department of State, Department of Homeland Security, Immigrations and 
Customs Enforcement, Department of the Interior, Department of Treasury, and the 
Defense Criminal Investigative Service (Department of Defense).  Generally, these types 
of actors perform specific types of counterterrorism responses which include but are not 
limited to investigations, interrogations, arrests and apprehensions, raids, formation of 
task forces and covert operations, and the creation and collaboration of legislation and 




Force, Army, Marines, Navy, and Coast Guard during times of war), military personnel 
or directives from within the Department of Defense, and the Defense Intelligence 
Agency (DIA).  Though the DIA informs on both civilian and military intentions and 
capabilities, its highest executive, save the President, is always at least a three star 
general or admiral, and unlike the CIA whose intelligence focus is more broad, it 
emphasizes defense and military topics during times of peace and war (see DIA Official).  
Therefore, any responses from the DIA to a terrorist threat or attack are considered to fall 
under the military model of counterterrorism.  The types of actions performed by military 
actors may include the same actions performed by criminal justice actors, but should be 
extended to include, among other things, troop deployments, border patrol and territorial 
occupation, diplomacy and humanitarian aid, foreign law enforcement and military 
training, weapons and tactical equipment procurement, firefights, air strikes, special and 
covert military operations, and targeted killings.    
The above section details the standards by which responses to terrorist threats and 
attacks are classified a criminal justice or military responses.  A description of the 
















































A criminal act will be defined as terrorism when the following criteria are met: 
 An individual or group commits or intends to commit an act of violence, or an 
individual affiliates with or provides material support to an individual or group 
known to commit or intending to commit an act of violence 
 The act is intended to harm, threaten, or incite fear in an audience greater than the 
immediate victims 
 The act is intended to achieve or bring awareness to a political, religious, or 
ideological goal 
A criminal justice response to terrorism will have one or more of the following characteristics: 
 Is carried out by one of the aforementioned law enforcement groups or agencies, either 
on domestic soil or abroad 
 An individual suspected of committing a terrorist act or of associating with a terrorist 
group is detained in a civilian prison, hospital, or behavioral treatment facility, or held in 
custody by a law enforcement agency 
 An individual suspected of committing a terrorist act or of associating with a terrorist 
group is prosecuted or tried either in criminal or civil court at the state or federal level
43
 
A military response to terrorism will have one or more of the following characteristics: 
 Is carried out by one of the aforementioned military actors, including the armed forces or 
other military agencies, possibly on domestic soil, but especially abroad 
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 There is speculation that in the future transnational terrorists may be tried at the International Criminal Court.  
This will most likely only occur if the ICC extends its jurisdiction under the justification that terrorism is labeled a 
crime against humanity.  For now, the ICC does not have jurisdiction to prosecute transnational terrorism cases 




 Typically, and especially after 9/11, the suspect is given the legal status of unlawful 
enemy combatant 
 An individual suspected of committing a terrorist act or of associating with a terrorist 
group is detained in military prison or hospital, military base or naval ship, or held in 
custody by an agent of the armed forces 
Though these models are presented independently and separate from one another and have 
distinct qualities, in practice, the two often overlap.  In some circumstances, law enforcement 
agencies such as the FBI and CIA will work with special operations forces or other military 
agents to track, detain, and interrogate terrorist suspects.  In other circumstances, suspects are 
apprehended by U.S. armed forces and sent back to the United States where they are detained in 
civilian prisons.  Since 9/11, and especially since the Military Commissions Act of 2009, there 
have been many cases in which suspects are detained in military prison, tried in military court, 
but appeal these decisions and receive a new trial in civilian court.  In any circumstance where 
both criminal justice and military responses are used, I recorded it as such, making special note 
of which type was the first response.   
Data and Methods 
The purpose of performing qualitative analysis is to better understand the applications of the 
theoretical models discussed in this research.  The criteria and definitions associated with the 
criminal justice and military models of counterterrorism presented in the previous section are 
derived from the theoretical framework and axioms presented in chapter (3).  In order to 
demonstrate the existence of these models in practice, one must know: 




2. What actors or institutions are involved in counterterrorism measures? And which ones 
are given priority? 
3. How are principles, policies, and laws related to counterterrorism applied in practice? 
4. How does the state explain or justify the use of adopted practices or perspectives on 
terrorism and counterterrorism measures? 
In order to answer these questions I performed a combination of historical, legal 
(content), and discourse analysis.  Historical analysis uses historical events, documents, and 
processes to develop a narrative of a particular topic or phenomena explaining how and why 
events occur the way they do (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003).  Though the primary data 
sources of historical analysis are often historical documents or historian interpretations, for the 
purposes of this research, historical analysis is performed using specific governmental 
documents and official military reports.  Content analysis is systematic analysis used to 
determine the presence of certain words, phrases, concepts, or themes within texts or media 
(Krippendorff 1980).  Discourse analysis focuses on understanding language and subject in order 
to extract key premises, themes, and concepts and to form relational associations.  It is 
considered to be the least systematic of the types of qualitative analyses employed, but is only 
used on rare occasions in this research where ambiguity in verbal or written discourse necessitate 
methodological decisions about that sources relevance to the data (Jorgensen and Phillips 2002).   
For all three forms of qualitative analysis, I used the Lexis-Nexis Database to examine 
more than 5000 news articles and legal case documents from major news publications all over 
the world from 1970-2014, some of which include The New York Times, Washington Post, 




Journal of Law and Public Policy, Dawn (Pakistan), and the Daily Star (Lebanon).
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  Global 
news sources were chosen as the main source of data for this portion of the qualitative work 
because they contain a collection of information points regarding terrorism events, terrorist 
groups and individuals, counterterrorism measures, counterterrorism actors, and terrorism 
prosecutions and convictions.  The sample size of publications, such as newspapers, news wires, 
and law reviews, were then reduced to only those relevant to this research including analyses and 
related reports of transnational terrorist events, namely events committed or plotted abroad 
against American citizens or property or events that were committed by non-U.S. citizens on 
American soil.
45
  In addition, content analysis was performed on legal case documents cataloged 
in the database of the Supreme Court of the United States, United States Courts Public Access to 
Electronic Court Records (PACER), and state level databases of supreme, civil, and county court 
records.  Historical analysis not only examined the content of the new articles returned in the 
Lexis Nexis search, but also included documents and press releases from the U.S. Department of 
Defense, Department of State, Office of the Executive as well as over 150 documents from the 
Defense Technical Information Center, which serves military operations reports written by 
military personnel.  Finally, discourse analysis was performed on transcriptions and quotes by 
the primary counterterrorism actors listed in table 9, also including the Department of the 
Executive and the President and presiding judicial officials and prosecutors of cases associated 
with terrorism.  Discourse analysis came from the news and legal case articles returned in the 
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 To identify relevant articles, I relied on the following combination of terms: Terroris* AND criminal OR case OR 
prosecution OR court OR detention OR sentenc* OR apprehen* OR military OR army OR Navy OR Naval OR 
Marine* OR armed forces 
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 I keep meticulous records of multiple publications surrounding the same event and/or prosecution.  I kept a tally 
for how many times each event/case appeared in my search.  I coded the event only once, but used the duplicate 
articles to fill in any missing information.  The duplicate publications, meaning the separate publications that were 
reporting on the same events, were then kept file in a separate document which classified the source, date, title, and 




Lexis Nexis search, as well as from public statements from relevant government representatives, 
made public through text transcriptions and videos on respective official government websites.   
 Using these data sources, I coded over 300 transnational terrorism related events.  It is 
important to note that the quantitative data, which coded 829 total events, does not include 
plotted terrorists events that were not carried out, while the qualitative data, especially the legal 
cases, include many arrests, detentions, prosecutions, operations, investigations, etc., of plotted 
attacks or terrorists associations and material support.  My analysis covered over 230 criminal 
proceedings (civil and military) and arrests involving allegations of terrorism, almost 150 
military operations, and hundreds of statements made by relevant actors.  While this analysis 
cannot possibly include every circumstance of terrorism (carried out or plotted) or support and 
association, it covers enough events, focusing on the concepts and definitions laid out in the 
previous section, to provide reliable answers to the questions posed above.   
Results of Historical Analysis of U.S. Counterterrorism Responses 
Of the 400 events examined in the qualitative analysis, over 150 (or 38%) of the included 
some type of military response.  This number does not include the counts of detentions in 
Guantanamo or domestic military bases or trialed by military tribunals, as that information will 
be presented with the content analysis.  Rather, the response types represented in this data 
include troop deployments, border patrol and territorial occupation, foreign law enforcement and 
military training, firefights, raids, air strikes, targeted killings, detentions abroad, covert and 
special operations, and formation of other task forces.  In many circumstances, multiple types of 
responses are deployed for a singular event or individual/group.   
There were several instances of retaliation against state sponsored terrorism that included 




Dorado Canyon against Libya in 1985, Operation Southern Watch against Iraq in 1993, and 
Operation Infinite Reach against Afghanistan and Sudan in 1998.   
Operation El Dorado Canyon.  The mid 1980s marked the rise in antagonistic relations 
between Libya, who had a long history of accusations of terrorism, smuggling, and espionage 
among other things, and the United States (Collins 2004).  Leading up to December 1985, the 
U.S. and other members of the international community had suspected Libya of engaging in state 
sponsored terrorism.  It is purported that the Libyan government had trained more than seven 
thousand terrorists, supplied more than 100 million dollars in arms and financial support to 
terrorist organizations, in addition to supplying housing, fake passports, and safe passage to 
many more (Prunckun and Mohr 1997).  The U.S. Department of State reports estimates that 
Libya gave more financial support to terrorist organizations in the 1980s than any other state 
apart from Iran.
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  In this case of state sponsored terrorism, tradition law enforcement methods 
used to combat terrorism were highly problematized.  Libya was accused of providing bases and 
training support to the terrorist organizations responsible for the airport attacked in Rome and 
Vienna in December of 1985.  By January 1986, diplomatic relations between the two countries 
had come to complete standstill.  In March, Libyan forces launched surface-to-air missile at 
naval aircraft and the U.S. Navy responded with force from their position in the Gulf of Sidra.  
This limited naval engagement culminated to a full-fledged military operation after the U.S. 
found incontrovertible evidence of Libya’s involvement in the bombing of TWA flight 840 over 
Greece on April 2, which killed four American citizens.  Two days later, Libya was blamed for 
the Berlin bombings at La Belle Discotheque wounded 261, 79 of whom were Americans and 
killed four Americans, one of which was a U.S. soldier (Endicott 1986, Collins 2004).   







Over 100 U.S. aircraft were called into action, bombing five specific target locations in 
Tripoli, Benghazi, and across northern Libya.  Long range strikes at “terrorist centers” began 
April 14 and included aircraft and operations support from both the U.S. Air Force, Navy, and 
Marine Corps and involved joint missions with the British Royal Airforce (Endicott 1986).  In 
addition, Air Force EF-111 Ravens employed electronic countermeasures in order to deceive and 
evade Libyan air defenses.  Naval aircraft struck Benina Airfield along with Benghazi and 
Aziziyah barracks in Tripoli and culminated the operation in a strike against Bilial (a terrorist 
training camp) and a USAF strike on Tripoli military airport (Collins 2004).   
 Operation Southern Watch.  In 1991, United Nations Security Council Resolution 688 
demanded an end to government led repression and observance of human rights law in Iraq.  
After Saddam Hussein’s regime refused to comply, the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) 
established a no fly zone over the southern part of the country in order to consolidate operations 
of the organized Joint Task Force Southwest, to command and control the operation, and to 
monitor compliance (Hines 2000).  The purpose of this contingency was mean to not only 
enforce UN sanctions, but also to protect Shiite Muslims undergoing prolonged attack from 
Sadaam’s regime in the aftermath of Desert Storm.  In addition to disregarding international 
human rights law, the Iraqi government breeched laws on nuclear, biological, and chemical 
weapons programs inspections (Allen 1992).   
 U.S. operations in Iraq escalated after an assassination attempt on former President 
George H. W. Bush in Kuwait 1993.  The U.S. government interviewed over sixteen suspected 
terrorists and seized several hundred pounds of bombs and explosives, and despite initial caution 
that the Iraqi government might not be involved, investigators became convinced by schematics 




Service (IIS) must have directed or been compliant in the assassination plot and the U.S. was 
“faced with the choice between doing nothing and using force” against what appeared to be state 
sponsored terrorism (Kosnik 2000).  USAF responded by bombing the headquarters of Iraqi 
Intelligence Service based on “compelling intelligence information” that apprehended suspects 
were working under the orders of the IIS (Malvesti 2001). 
 The Joint Task Force contingency continued in Southern Iraq and culminated two 
additional terrorist attacks nearly two years later.  In November 1995, Saudi Arabian and U.S. 
forces were attacked in Riyadh, with the perpetrators bombing a U.S.-leased military building 
resulting in five deaths and numerous burns and injuries (Gillespie 2011).  A terrorist 
organization known as the Islamic Movement for Change claimed responsibility for the attack 
and U.S. officials speculated their motivations surrounding continued military operations in Iraq 
and Kuwait (CNN News).  Several months later, June 1996, a terrorist bombing killed nineteen 
and wounded 547 USAF airmen at Dhahran Airbase in Saudi Arabia, also known as the Khobar 
Towers bombings.  The towers were being used to house coalition forces of Operation Southern 
Watch and the attack was believed to have been carried out by Hizbollah Al-Hejaz, whose group 
was arrested and dismantled after the attack (Matthiesen 2010).   
 In response to these attacks, the U.S. amped up military operations in Southern Iraq.  On 
September 3, 1996, USAF enacted an airstrike bellow the 32
nd
 parallel, while naval forces 
launched cruise missile strikes.  President Clinton expanded the no fly zone to just south of 
Baghdad, which, in conjunction with Operation Northern Watch and Operation Provide Comfort, 
extended over most of the airspace in Iraq (Allen 1992).  These terrorist attacks also resulted in 
the relocation and commission of U.S. forces to areas more easily defended against terrorism as 




Operation Infinite Reach.  Prior to the embassy bombings in 1998, al-Qaeda had engaged 
in significant levels of violent activity, including the billeting of 100 American peacekeepers at 
the Somalian border, the attempted bombing of a hotel in Yemen, the 1993 World Trade Center 
truck bombing, the killing of 18 American soldiers in Mogadishu, a car bomb in Riyadh which 
resulted in seven deaths, an assassination attempt on Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, the 
Khobar Tower bombings which resulted in the death of 19 and injury of 264 American soldiers, 
and a bus bombing in Egypt that killed nine tourists (Weiner 1998, Wedgwood 1999, Phinney 
2003).  After his expulsion from Khartoum in 1996, bin Laden strengthened extremist operations 
in East Africa, placing terrorism cells in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania.  On the morning 
of August 7, 1998, al-Qaeda set off truck bombs at the U.S. embassies in these two Africa cities.  
The explosion in Nairobi destroyed the embassy and collapsed a nearby building killing 213 
people and wounding over 4,000.  The bomb in Dar-es-Salaam resulted in eleven deaths and 85 
injuries.
47
   
 President Clinton moved swiftly and forcefully.  After the Oklahoma City bombings in 
1995, “Congress empowered [Clinton] to use all necessary means, including covert action and 
military force, to disrupt, dismantle, and destroy international infrastructure used by international 
terrorists including overseas terrorist training facilities and safe havens (Phinney 2003).”  The 
U.S. received same day evidence of bin Laden’s involvement and within five days had “very 
reliable” proof of his involvement as well as the plotting of future attacks (Myers 1998).  
Claiming a right to self-defense, U.S. government organized a naval counterattack that involved 
cruise missile strikes in Afghanistan and Sudan, as well as brief travel through Pakistani airspace 
and the Arabian Sea.   
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 On August 14, the simultaneous attacks were launched against Khost training camp, also 
known as “Terrorist University”,  just south of Kabul and al-Shifa pharmaceutical factory, 
believed to engage in the production of chemical weapons, in Khartoum North.  Naval forces, 
situated in the Arabian Sea, launched a strike of 70 Tomahawk missiles over Pakistani airspace, 
hitting their intended target of Khost, ultimately resulting in the deaths of around 50 
individuals.
48
  Over six thousand kilometers away on the Red Sea Coast of Sudan, naval aircraft 
carriers launched thirteen Tomahawk missiles at al-Shifa, destroying the entire factory, killing 
the night watchman and wounding ten Sudanese (Phinney 2003).  
Operation Enduring Freedom. Of the 151 events that received military responses, 79 of 
them occurred before the 9/11 attacks.  That military responses before 9/11 make up over half of 
the observations reflects the results of the quantitative analysis; that 9/11 did not necessarily 
signify a shift from the criminal justice model to the military model for the U.S. in 
counterterrorism response behavior.  Instead, the historical analysis seems to indicate that, as 
regards transnational terrorism, the military model of counterterrorism was sometimes a first line 
of defense well before 9/11.  Recall that this specific set of observations does not include any 
military tribunals or detentions and it is important to note that the first military prosecution or 
detention that I recorded occurred in 2001, so prosecutions and detentions should not be 
considered a possible response type until after 9/11.  Even so, these 79 events of military 
responses occurring before 9/11, when considered with the entirety of the data, account for 20 
percent of all of the observations.   
Though many of the response types mentioned under the military model in table (1) were 
employed before 9/11, some of them became more frequent after the attacks.  For example, I 
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recorded five targeted killings in the thirty years before 2001.  This low number is likely due in 
large part to Executive order 12333, issued in by President Reagan in 1981, which effectively 
stated that any agent of the U.S. shall not engage in or conspire to engage in assassination, as 
long as the individual or organization in not in combat against the United States, in which case 
the order does not apply.  This order was later relaxed by the Clinton Administration and 
counteracted by the Bush Administration which authorized “all necessary and appropriate force” 
against terrorism (Kaplan 2006).  Bush’s congressional resolution led to the increased use of 
unmanned combat aerial vehicles (drones), so in the thirteen years after 2001, I recorded 117 
targeted killings, while the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) officially 
reports the number of deaths to be over 2,000.
49
   
Tactics like bombings and air strikes appear to have been more frequent before, while, 
missions deploying U.S. special operations forces appear to be on the rise post 9/11.  The DTIC 
documents from the historical analysis suggest that the increase in special operations is largely 
due to the growing military budgets which are better able to fund and support counterterrorist 
and counterinsurgency missions.  In fact, the years following major terrorist events or that have 
greater frequency of events showed larger increases in the military expenditures.  For example, 
the quantitative data set recorded nearly 30 international terrorist attacks on the U.S. in 1991.  In 
1992, military expenditures increased six percent from the previous year and remained relatively 
stable or slightly increasing until they fell by 12 percent in 1995.  This time period includes the 
Gulf War (ended February 1991) and humanitarian missions in Somalia, but also terrorist events 
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Other sources have suggested that this report grossly underestimates the total number of deaths as well as the total 





such as World Trade Center Bombings, for which the response was a special forces co-operation 
with Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence that resulted in the brief military detention and 
eventual criminal conviction of Ramzi Yousef, and other counterterrorism responses such as 
Operation Southern Watch.   
Results of the Content and Legal Analysis 
Of the 232 criminal cases coded, there were 93 cases that included a military arrest, 
detention, or prosecution, accounting for 40 percent of the total observations.  Fifty of these 
cases occurred before 9/11, which accounts for over half of all cases surveyed that included a 
military response.  Of the 93 cases that included military response there were 20 convictions in 
military tribunals (occurring only after 2001) and 69 military detentions.  Looking further into 
the detention observations, there were 4 cases in which a suspect was first held in military 
detention and later moved to criminal detention.  Looking into the prosecutions data, there were 
44 cases that were first held in military tribunals, appealed and later brought to civil criminal 
court and 9 cases that were first tried criminally and were later brought to military tribunal.   
There are several conclusions that can be made by analyzing this data.  First, when U.S. 
citizens are suspected of committing transnational terrorist attacks (i.e., a U.S. citizen affiliating 
with a known terrorist organization, or plotting an attack against Americans abroad) the 
government appears more likely to respond through the criminal justice system than with 
military force or tribunal.  Of the 18 cases coded in which U.S. citizens were accused of an act of 
transnational terrorism, over 72 percent of them were responded to purely through the criminal 
justice system.  These responses included law enforcement task forces, police apprehensions, 
federal and state prison detentions, and criminal court proceedings.  The remaining 28 percent 




conjunction with criminal justice approaches.  Only one of these individuals, Jose Padilla, was 
tried in a military commission for his involvement with al-Qaeda and his plot to detonate a dirty 
bomb.  In addition, individuals from Western democratic nations, who are often extradited back 
to their home countries for trial, are more often apprehended and detained by law enforcement 
officials.  One exception is Omar Khadr, a Canadian, tried for war crimes and detained at 
Guantanamo Bay for his involvement in the September 11 attacks and association with al-Qaeda.   
Affiliation with Islamist extremist groups seems be another indicator of military 
response.  Individuals listed as associating with groups such as al-Qaeda, al-Shabab, and 
Hizbollah were more often apprehended, detained, tried, or incapacitated through military means 
than individuals associated with other types of extremist groups.  This appears to be true 
throughout the temporal range of the study, and is not limited to post-9/11 cases.  In addition, 
individuals affiliated with al-Qaeda, specifically, are more often pursued through military 
responses even when an attack is not carried out than individuals who do not carry out attacks 
and are affiliated with out terrorist organizations.  There were 57 cases in which an individual 
was tried for affiliation or for an attack plot that was not carried out.  Of those cases, over 40 
percent were listed as having affiliations with al-Qaeda and 77 percent of those individuals were 
pursued, apprehended, incapacitated, detained, or tried through military action.  Furthermore, of 
the individuals accused of involvement in the 9/11 attacks, 92 percent were apprehended, 
detained, or prosecuted by military forces.     
During the time frame of the analysis, individuals suspected of terrorist actions against 
the US came from every corner of the globe, including allies UK, Denmark, and Jordan; small 
countries like Eritrea, Lebanon, and Macedonia and large countries such as Russia, Egypt, and 




Australia, Nigeria, Colombia, and France.  However, individuals of certain citizenship may be 
more likely to be pursued via military response over or in conjunction with criminal justice 
responses.  It has already been established that the U.S may be less likely to pursue military 
responses against individuals from western nations, but this assumption should be extended to 
include other allies, who are also predominantly Muslim nations, such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, 
and Jordan.
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  Terrorist suspects from most other predominantly Muslim nations are often 
pursued using military action or a combination of military and criminal justice response types.  
In particular, these counties include Yemen, with over 90 percent of analyzed cases receiving a 
military response, Lebanon, over 80 percent, Pakistan, over 77 percent, and Sudan and Libya, 
with over 70 percent of cases analyzed having some type of military response. 
The criminal justice model rests on a foundation of observance of democratic principles 
and preservation of individual liberties.  Throughout the search, I kept a separate note for cases 
which reported civil liberties and human rights violations, especially those cases in which the 
American Civil Liberties Union or a human rights organization became involved.  A little more 
than 10 percent of cases reported some type of rights violation, which include, but is not limited 
to denial of medical attention, torture and waterboarding, cruel interrogation tactics, illegal 
detention without due process or without charge, and denial of rights to an attorney.  Based on 
the foundational principles of the criminal justice model, we would expect most of these cases to 
come from military apprehensions and detentions, but, in fact, nearly 60 percent of those cases 
occurred in the civilian criminal justice system.  Suspects held in civil-criminal detention were 
reportedly regularly denied access to doctors, attorneys, and speedy trials and were subject to 
torture and enhanced interrogation techniques such as sleep deprivation, isolation, and forcible 
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drinking of deathly amounts of salt water.  Military detentions add several other violations to the 
list including beatings, burnings, and forced sodomy.       
Overall, the data suggest that the U.S. more often uses force, specifically covert and 
special operations, raids, air strikes, targeted killings, and troop deployments, in response to 
terrorism when the act of terrorism is carried out abroad.  This fact is evidenced by four major 
military operations in response to state sponsored terrorism (el Dorado Canyon, Southern Watch, 
Infinite Reach, Enduring Freedom).  Of the 40 coded attacks that were actually carried out 
against American citizens or property on foreign soil, 85 percent were responded to using some 
form of the military responses listed in this paragraph.  Of the 15 percent of cases that received 
only a criminal justice response, over 40 percent were U.S. citizens.  
Results of the Discourse Analysis 
The term enemy combatant first appears in the data in 2000 under the case of David 
Hicks, an Australian, who was detained at Guantanamo for his involvement with the Lashkar-e- 
Taiba, and for his training and creation of recruitment videos for an al-Qaeda training camp 
known as al-Farouq.  Since then the term appeared in case files of 27 individuals, out of the 44 
total that were tried at any point in military commission.  In addition, the term appeared in 130 of 
the over 300 statements that were coded by relevant political actors, the bulk of which were after 
9/11.   
Similar terminologies that suggest the acts of the individual are to be considered an act of 
war appear intermittently before 9/11.  Some examples of these terminologies include “war 




9/11 phrase is “war against terrorism (war on terror).”
51
  While the Bush administration brought 
the phrase “war on terror” to the forefront of political discussion, my analysis codes former 
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright as deeming terrorism the “war of the future” in 1998.
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Even so, the Secretary’s statement came half a decade after Congress officially declared 
terrorism an “act of war” (Crona and Richardson 1996, Perl 2007).  The case files suggest that 
individuals receiving the label of enemy combatant or accused of committing war crimes or 
using terrorism to “wage war” are often pursued and apprehended through military means, 
whether alone or with the help of law enforcement agencies like the CIA or FBI or foreign police 
forces, detained at a military base or prison, or receive a military tribunal.  In fact, all of the 20 
convictions in military court remarked the defendant as an enemy combatant or war criminal.   
Recall from the previous section, that the U.S. is more likely to use criminal justice 
response on its own citizens when suspected of terrorism, with a few exceptions, including Jose 
Padilla.  From the outset, Padilla was considered an “enemy combatant”, as were the other two 
major cases of U.S. citizens who were pursued through some form of military response.
53
  John 
Walker Lindh was an “enemy combatant” arrested in 2001 for fighting with the Taliban against 
coalition forces, captured by U.S. Army Special Forces and detained at Camp Rhino outside 
Kandahar. He was later indicted by a federal jury on a number of charges, including conspiracy 
to commit murder, providing material support to a terrorist organization, and contributing and 
supplying service to al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Yasser Esam Hamdi, a naturalized U.S citizen 
raised in Saudi Arabia, was first captured by the Afghan Northern Alliance forces in November 
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2001, but was recaptured after a prison uprising, which resulted in a three day battle with U.S. 
AC-130 gunships and Black Hawk helicopters.  Hamdi was transported to and detained in 
Guantanamo Bay and later transferred to a naval prison in Norfolk, Virginia.  Though at first, he 
refused a lawyer, the “enemy combatant” petitioned a federal court and his case was heard in the 
Supreme Court in 2004 (see Hamdi v. Rumsfeld above).   
Another major point highlighted by the trials of these three terrorist suspects, who were 
also U.S. citizens, is their affiliation with al-Qaeda. This, too, may have played in their 
characterization as enemy combatants.  While there were a few times throughout the analysis 
that individuals associated with al-Qaeda and its affiliates, in my limited search, nearly every 
circumstance in which an individual was classified as an enemy combatant or relevant actors 
used the rhetoric of “war criminal” or “waging war”, that individual was also mentioned as 
having affiliation with al-Qaeda, the Taliban, or Osama bin Laden.  It is likely that affiliation 
with one of these groups, dictated the subsequent labeling of the individual as enemy combatant.  
In addition, status of enemy combatant may have ultimately led to these individuals’ pursuit 
through military action.   
Conclusions  
 The qualitative analysis seems to reflect the results of the quantitative analysis in several 
respects.  First, it reassures the conclusion that the U.S. has consistently used military responses 
in its counterterrorism strategy, contradicting conventional thought which suggests military 
responses are post-9/11 phenomena.  It affirms that 9/11 may not have been the significant 
turning point in counterterrorism policy as regards displays of force or military action in 
response to terrorist events. This is not to suggest that 9/11 was not a significant event in the 




suggests that 9/11 did not signify a sudden break in counterterrorism policy specifically shifting 
from a wholly criminal justice approach to a wholly military approach.  It shows that military 
responses have long been a strategic tool, either independently of or in conjunction with, 
criminal justice response to terrorism. 
 Second, discourse analysis affirms that GDP may not be the sole or primary consideration 
as regards military action in the face of terrorism.  The quantitative analysis found GDP to be an 
insignificant predictor of military expenditures in a system that included terrorist events.  
Discourse analysis returned consistent rhetoric of ramping up public and international safety and 
security through military means in the wake of terrorist events.  The rhetoric of increased 
military action was even sustained through the country’s recessions in the 80s, early 90s, and the 
Great Recession beginning in December 2007.  This implies that decision makers consider 
security policy, specifically counterterrorism policy, distinct from other economic matters and 
supports prior research suggesting that the relationship between military spending and economic 
growth to be insignificant, or at the very least, varies from short-run to long-run projections 
(Biswas and Ram 1986, Knight, Loayza, and Villanueva 1996).   
 Third, the existence of ongoing conflict does not appear to be at the forefront of 
consideration or discussion when electing to respond to terrorism.  Rarely, with the exception of 
the War on Terror, do actors mention counterterrorism strategy in juxtaposition with other 
defense type strategies and operations.  Not one of the speeches coded around the time of 
Operation Southern Watch mentioned our involvement in the Bosnian War, or that our presence 
in the Balkans somehow affected our military counterterrorism capabilities in Iraq.  This echoes 
the quantitative findings that the existence of ongoing conflict is an insignificant indicator of 




public opinion.  In fact, in each decade of the analysis the U.S. was engage in some kind of 
militarized conflict.  Yet, for example, when the embassies were bombed in Africa in 1998 the 
U.S. sent naval reinforcements, despite our deep involvement in the war in Kosovo.  Other 
examples include Army Special Forces Operations after the 1993 World Trade Center bombing 
while we were engaged in the Somali Civil War, and Achille Lauro cruise ship hijacking in 1985 
to which President Bush responded by sending Navy SEAL Team Six and Delta Force for a 
rescue mission (Bohn 2004).  Rhetoric surrounding these terrorist events did not include 
discussions of the existing militarized conflicts in which the U.S. was already engaged.  In fact, 
until Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom, it was rare that a relevant 
counterterrorism actor, and especially the President, would discuss terrorism and intent for a 
militarized response in the same statement as an acknowledgment of an ongoing militarized 
conflict.   
The qualitative results also suggest many things that the quantitative data simply could 
not measure.  Where the quantitative analysis focused mainly on the link between terrorism and 
the military, the qualitative analysis answers more questions about criminal justice response to 
terrorism and the relationship between the two counterterrorism models presented.  What the 
results show is that the two models are not necessarily independent of one another.  For 
parsimony’s sake, the theories of the counterterrorism models are presented as two distinct 
concepts, separate from one another, but in practice the two very much overlap.  Historical and 
content analysis gave narrative of military forces operating alongside police forces in the pursuit 
and capture of terrorist suspects, of military detention facilities operating alongside criminal 
courts, and, most important, working simultaneously through whatever means to combat future 




Discourse analysis confirmed that terrorism was not really discussed in terms of war until 
the late 1990s.  A few of the DTIC documents spoke about terrorists as war criminals, or as 
waging war against the U.S., but official rhetoric from the Executive Office, Cabinet Offices, or 
other relevant actors mainly talked about terrorism on its own terms; as terrorism, with 
intermittent discussion of the criminality of it.  It also suggests that 9/11 did not necessarily 
change the way that relevant counterterrorism actors viewed or understood terrorism as concerns 
the dichotomy of the criminal justice and military models.  I believe it might be incorrect to say 
that terrorism was once understood as crime and since 9/11 is understood as an act of war.  
Rather, terrorism became understood as an act of war in the early 90s with Congressional 
declaration of its legal status as such and became a permanent part of the rhetoric a few years 
later.  Furthermore, terrorism never seemed to be understood a ‘just a crime’ rather it was often 
discussed as its own category of deviance or a culmination of the most unspeakable violent 
criminal acts.   
The content analysis demonstrated a relationship between which counterterrorism model 
was used to pursue a suspect and the suspect’s citizenship and/or organizational affiliation(s).  
Suspects from certain non-ally countries, especially those that are predominantly Muslim appear 
to be pursued more through military means, while suspects from Western states from ally states 
of the U.S. appear to be pursued mostly through criminal justice means.  Additionally, 
individuals who have affiliations with al-Qaeda, Taliban, or bin Laden are almost always 
pursued through some type of military response.  It also suggests that the criminal justice model 
may be no more likely than the military model to observe due process, civil liberties, and human 
rights.   




1. How does the state understand transnational terrorism? 
2. What actors or institutions are involved in counterterrorism measures? And which ones 
are given priority? 
3. How are principles, policies, and laws related to counterterrorism applied in practice? 
4. How does the state explain or justify the use of adopted practices or perspectives on 
terrorism and counterterrorism measures? 
First, the U.S. originally understood terrorism as its own class of offense, but sometimes spoke 
of it in terms of existing criminal rhetoric.  It grew to understand terrorism as an act of war 
beginning in the 90s, and solidified that understanding through the 2000s and 2010s.  Second, the 
qualitative analysis gives a better understanding of which actors are involved in counterterrorism 
and which ones are most important.  While an expansive list of relevant actors are given in Table 
1, the most important actors in transnational counterterrorism appear to be the President, armed 
forces, CIA, FBI, Secret Service, and criminal court officials.  Third, relevant laws to 
counterterrorism have been discussed throughout the dissertation, and have proven to be 
important factors in shaping counterterrorism responses and how those responses are carried out.  
At the same time, the laws leave room for ambiguity so that decision makers have room to make 
judgements based on the evidence of the case at hand.  In circumstance where decision makers 
over step their boundaries, the criminal justice system is ready to supersede when necessary (for 
example Hamdi v. Rumsfeld).  Finally, as U.S. rhetoric shifted toward an understanding of 
terrorism as a war crime, it was much more fluid for decision makers to justify military 
responses and harsher criminal sentences because terrorists are “enemy combatants,” who “wage 
war” against the U.S. and its citizens.  The U.S. long painted the image of the “savage” enemy 




pictorial of “terrorists,” rather than individuals, criminals, or defendants, that was used to 
validate the government’s response.
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 This dissertation set out to answer three questions: (1) How do governments respond to 
terrorism, (2) What determines the choices of states’ counterterrorism strategies, and (3) how do 
these strategies affect other domestic political phenomena?  In order to answer these questions, I 
synthesized terrorism and counterterrorism literature from multiple disciplines, international 
relations, law, criminology, and, to a lesser extent, sociology, alongside practical 
conceptualizations, policies, and procedures of major counterterrorism actors and institutions.  I 
examined the history of counterterrorism practice in the United States to afford a deeper 
conceptual and practical understanding of the criminal justice and military models of 
counterterrorism.  These models were then theorized for the purposes of empirical investigation, 
both quantitative and qualitative.  I performed vector autoregressive analysis to investigate the 
codependent relationship between terrorism and U.S. military activity as outlined in the military 
model of counterterrorism, as well as included a measure for the role of public opinion, which is 
known in the American Political Science literature to be a driving force of military spending.  I 
performed qualitative analysis to further investigate the criminal justice model of 
counterterrorism, as well as to uncover the reasons and justifications for varying U.S. 
counterterrorism strategies.  Both the quantitative and qualitative results suggest that neither 
model is wholly effective at combatting and preventing terrorism.   
So, what does it mean to combat terrorism?  If terrorism is understood to be political, 
ideological, or religious violence with the goal of inflicting fear upon a larger audience, then 
state’s counterterrorism tactics must reflect this definition and attempt to preclude terrorists from 
accomplishing their supposed end goal of socio-political change.  The U.S. has attempted a 




gathering vital intelligence, fostering international cooperation, administering harsh penalties to 
perpetrators, maintaining impenetrable physical, financial, and technical security, and promoting 
coordination among domestic counterterrorism agencies.  However, success has been lacking in 
several of these areas and the U.S has yet to adopt a best practice counterterrorism strategy that 
targets the utility of terrorism at its core.   
Research remains relatively inconclusive about what the origins of terrorism may be and 
what allows it thrive and flourish, making it exceedingly difficult for counterterrorism policies to 
target terrorism at its source.
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  Instead, states are left to pull from their existing repertoire of 
criminal justice and military oriented strategies that merely react to the existence of terrorism 
rather than to prevent it before it begins.  Perhaps another complication to the prevention of 
terrorism at its source is the lack of a precise and universal definition of the concept.  It seems as 
if each domestic agency, both in the U.S. and elsewhere, operate with their own understanding of 
what constitutes a terrorist act, effectively narrowing the ability for interagency cooperation.  
Even more, the lack of a universal definition by states limits the opportunities for them to 
cooperate on policy and response coordination.   
The biggest stride towards international cooperation on a counterterrorism regime came 
with the UN adoption of the Global Counterterrorism Strategy.  Through its adoption, members 
agreed to a common strategic and operational approach to counterterrorism, but the practical 
aspects of this approach, however, remain vague.  For example, the plan of action agrees to 
“consistently, unequivocally, and strongly condemn terrorism” and to “take urgent action to 
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prevent and combat terrorism” through full cooperation of “counterterrorism subsidiary bodies.”  
This plan of action is, in fact, devoid of any real conversation about actions that will be taken to 
combat terrorism or the necessary actors and institutions involved.   
Instead of international cooperation against terrorism, states are mostly left to make 
counterterrorism policy decisions at the domestic level.  This is where thorough conceptual and 
theoretical knowledge of counterterrorism models becomes crucial for understanding how states 
view terrorism and its perpetrators, what actors and institutions are involved in the 
counterterrorism process, what tools are within the state’s repertoire and how they are employed, 
what institutions, policies, and procedures facilitate counterterrorism methods, and how states 
justify the methods they employ.   
One way to discern types of counterterrorism policy is to view them as part of a criminal 
justice or military response type.  The criminal justice model of counterterrorism has been 
presented as a type of government response to terrorism that pursues, detains, prosecutes, and 
punishes perpetrators uses the existing criminal justice system.  The military model of 
counterterrorism is presented as a type of government response to terrorism that use military 
rules of engagement to preempt, pursue, detain, punish, and retaliate against terrorist and 
terrorism.   
Both models have advantages and shortcomings.  The criminal justice model is often 
thought of as the first line of strategy for two reasons.  First, this model is deployed using the 
existing criminal justice infrastructure effectively lowering utility costs of combatting terrorism.  
Perpetrators are pursued by law enforcement actors and agencies whose tasks already include 
bringing violent criminals to justice.  Similarly, these perpetrators, once apprehended are 




Second, the criminal justice model sets its foundations on the observance of democratic 
principles such as rule of law and due process and on the respect of individual civil liberties.  
Democracies look to rule of law to maintain order and to prevent against arbitrary abuses of 
power, two qualities that are part of what makes a democracy a democracy (Hutchison 1987).  
Observing these principles through its counterterrorism policies allows democracies to maintain 
their liberal democratic identities while engaging in practices that otherwise might toe the line of 
indiscretion.   
That said, it is this adherence to democratic principles and observance of human rights 
that infringes on the abilities of law enforcement actors to pursue and punish terrorists by any 
means necessary in order to prevent future terrorism.  In addition, red tape in the bureaucratic 
legal system over burdens prosecutors with the tenets of evidentiary proof, presumption of 
innocence, public and speedy trials, and appropriateness of punishment and sentencing.  
Furthermore, sociological and political research suggests that terrorists may not be deterred by 
punishments offered through the penal system, up to and including the death penalty (Banks, 
Nevers, and Wallerstein 2008, Bedau 1997).   
The military model alleviates some of the restrictions that domestic bureaucracy and 
institutions put on the criminal justice model, allowing military responses to be more flexible in 
their ability to prevent and combat terrorism.  Following the military rules of engagement 
permits states to exercise their monopoly on violence and employ acts of “appropriate forcible 
response to terrorism (Travalio and Altenburg 2003).”  Some argue this show of force acts as a 
plausible deterrent for future acts of violence generating a credible threat for the prospect of 
retaliation (see Crenshaw 1987 and Trapp 2007), while others argue that displays of force only 




2008).  In addition to the inconclusiveness of its effectiveness of combating terrorism, the 
military model lacks a clear framework for recognizing a terrorist enemy and for how and when 
the model should be applied.  Rhetoric from decision makers as well as military personnel 
repeatedly assert that today’s terrorists are indiscernible from the ordinary citizen, hiding among 
the crowds and in cities and villages, wearing everyday street clothes instead of uniforms, and 
hoping to stay hidden.  Even more, once states set their sights on a perpetrator, there is no 
systematic way to determine whether to pursue that individual using military means, or whether, 
once apprehended, the individual should be detained and prosecuted in military tribunal.  
Because the military model allows the state to engage in symmetric violence against terrorist 
perpetrators, there is an assumption that military models may more easily violate civil liberties 
and human rights (Kielsgard 2005).  
 Based on how each model is conceptualized, I made several theoretical assumptions 
about their association with terrorism as well as relevant political processes.  Since the criminal 
justice system views terrorism as a crime, respects democratic principles, and exercises restraint 
on violence, it may be expected that its repertoire of available response strategies seek to utilize 
the law enforcement actors and existing criminal laws and institutions, refrain from overt 
displays of violence, and guarantee the Constitutional liberties of all terrorist suspects.  Since the 
military model uses the military rules of engagement, permitting the state to use force to prevent 
and combat terrorism, and is sensitive to fluctuations in public opinion, we might expect that 
terrorism increases military activity and sways public opinion in favor of increased military 
activity, subsequently affecting military spending.  Conventional wisdom and previous research 
has led to the assumptions that the criminal justice model is the first line of defense in 




 The results of this dissertation have affirmed existing views of the two models, 
challenged others, and afforded new assumptions about the conceptualizations of the models.  
The quantitative research, focusing predominantly on the military model, demonstrates a 
significant and positive relationship between the supply of terrorism and military activity.  As 
attacks increase in frequency and magnitude, we should expect a relative rise military activity 
over the next several years, above and beyond standard patterns of spending increases.  This 
pattern exists long before the 9/11 attacks and persists well beyond it.  In fact, 9/11 proved to be 
an insignificant predictor of military spending as related to terrorist attacks over time.   
 The results also demonstrate that terrorism has direct effects on public opinion, which in 
turn has a direct effect on military activity.  As terrorist attacks increase in frequency and 
magnitude, so too does the call of the public for heightened security by way of military action.  
Specifically, terrorist attacks incentivize the general public to want to spend more on the 
military, and policy makers acquiesce, usually in the next budgetary cycle.  This is the 
demonstrated indirect effect of terrorism on the military, filtered through public opinion.  
Though this finding stands alone as a causal predictor of future military spending, the 
quantitative models do not include measures for other possible predictors of military spending 
such as other stakeholders in counterterrorism and defense policy such as defense contractors 
and civil military organizations.     
 Perhaps the most underwhelming finding, or lack thereof, of the quantitative research was 
the inability to confirm whether or not increases in military activity affect future supplies of 
terrorism.  This is the finding needed to determine the effectiveness of the military model; 
whether or not use of force actually decreases terrorism.  The preliminary results suggest a 




contemporaneously.  If this be the case, these results are consistent with Braithwaite and Li 
(2007), Savun and Phillips (2009), and Azam and Thelen (2010), who all find that military 
action, in one capacity or another, increases terrorism.  However, more data is needed to 
statistically confirm the significance of these results as presented in the dissertation.   
 The qualitative analysis is able to explore the associations and implications of the 
criminal justice model as well as provide a narrative of the nuances between the two models of 
counterterrorism.  The purpose of this analysis is to understand how the U.S. understands 
terrorism, what actors and institutions are involved in the counterterrorism process, what 
principles and laws guide counterterrorism practice, and how the U.S. explains and justifies the 
use of adopted policies.  In addition, the analysis is able to provide a better image of how both 
the criminal justice and military models are systematized in their practice and how the two 
models overlap.   
 First, the qualitative analysis is consistent quantitative research in that it suggests that the 
military model has been consistently employed long before 9/11.  Both analysis of practice and 
rhetoric display consistent patterns of employment of the tools of the military model both before 
and after the attacks.  However, a more nuanced perspective suggests that although the general 
practice of military response has not changed, the specific tactic employed may have.  
Specifically, prior to 9/11 military responses more regularly consisted of bombings and air 
strikes, whereas after 9/11 the popular methods shifted to covert operations, including raids and 
task forces, and targeted killings.   
 Second, the assumption that terrorism is viewed as a crime in the criminal justice model 
and as an act of war in the military model also loses elements of its validity.  While this 




conceptualizations of terrorism for policy decision makers is more nuanced.  The model is 
correct to assume that criminal justice models view terrorism as a crime, but terrorist crime, 
specifically, is viewed as anything but ordinary.  Instead terrorism has been positioned in its own 
class of appalling deviance, and has been routinely debated as an aggravating factor in criminal 
sentencing, or as its own category of criminal action (Wattad 2006).  In addition, despite regular 
counterterrorism responses through military institutions, terrorism is not understood an as act of 
war until the 1990s.  When President Regan gave his speech in 1986 entitled “The Fight Against 
Terrorism,” informing citizens of the U.S. launching of Operation El Dorado Canyon, he referred 
to terrorism as “criminal behavior.”
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  The dichotomizing of the view of terrorism as crime or 
war is a relatively new phenomenon, first occurring with the Clinton Administration in 1993. 
 Third, the criminal justice model is just as likely as the military model to commit civil 
liberty and human rights violations.  The prevailing conceptualization of the criminal justice 
model, and an assumption included in the theoretical framework in Chapter 3, is that it lays its 
foundation on the preservation of these democratic principles.  If that assumption were true, we 
could expect that criminal justice responses would be less likely to violate these principles than 
military response.  The qualitative results suggest that both types of response are equally likely to 
commit these infractions, albeit in different ways.  Those committed by the military model 
appear to be more severe and violent in nature, while those committed by the criminal justice 
model more routinely include civil liberties violations and torture-light type actions.   
 Perhaps the most interesting of the qualitative findings is the manner in which the 
criminal justice and military models and tools, especially detentions and prosecution, are applied 
at the individual level.  The theoretical frameworks of these models do not afford any 
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expectations about the characterizations of terrorists or terrorism that would receive a criminal or 
military response from the government.  However, in practice there does appear to be some 
discernible patterns about how and to whom these models have been applied.  First, Muslim 
individuals from states that are not U.S. allies are more likely to be pursued, detained, and 
prosecuted through military means.  Second, individuals from Western and democratic states or 
from states that are allies of the U.S. are more likely to be pursued, detain, and prosecuted using 
the criminal justice system.  However, there is one exception, any individual thought to be in 
affiliation with Islamist extremist groups is almost always pursued through military means, and 
this proves to be true throughout the temporal range of the study.   
 What, then, are the takeaways from this study?  First, the criminal justice and military 
models of counterterrorism are often presented as two separate and distinct conceptualizations of 
counterterrorism strategy.  In reality, the two overlap more than they are separate.  Many 
examples show individuals that are pursued by special operations forces and handed over to law 
enforcement agencies for civil-criminal detentions and trials.  Other examples include 
individuals who are detained and tried in military commissions but later appeal to the Supreme 
Court and are sentenced to civil-criminal punishments.   
 Second, we must consider the implications of the finding that the criminal justice model 
is no less likely to commit civil liberty and human rights violations than the military model.  This 
premise holds in the existing literature as one of the main reasons democracies turn to the 
criminal justice system to prosecute terrorism as opposed to disproportionate displays of force 
and violence to eradicate their opponent.  If criminal justice tactics are indeed just as likely to 
violate democratic principles and if terrorists really are not deterred by punishment, then what 




have more data about the effectiveness of criminal institutions in combatting terrorism, the 
continued use of the criminal justice model of counterterrorism rests solely on the proposition 
that it maintains lower utility costs than other response types because it works through existing 
institutions.  
 Third, both models of counterterrorism seem to arbitrarily discriminate against Muslims 
and predominantly Muslim states, save a few U.S. allies.  This may come as little surprise given 
recent crusades abroad again Islamist radicalism and extremism in the 2000s and 2010s, but 
qualitative data suggests that Muslim U.S. citizens are also disproportionately treated with 
military responses.  This exposes an institutional and systematic bias against Muslim individuals 
and states, guilty or innocent of terrorism crimes, and contributes to the dangerous narrative that 
conflates Islam and terrorism.  Effectively, these results demonstrate that the U.S. systemically 
treats suspected terrorists affiliated with Islam as more dangerous, when in fact, statistical 
research suggests that it is not ideology, but organizational structure that makes groups more or 
less deadly (Piazza 2009).  Focusing most of our efforts on one type of ideological terrorism may 
distract us from thwarting the next biggest opponent.   
    Fourth, military measures of counterterrorism have direct effects on political processes 
at home.  Specifically, those tested in the dissertation include actual spending, which has a 
correlation to the budgetary process itself, and public opinion, signaling and policy adoption.  
These political effects, which rarely receive due consideration, especially in the case of the 
military model, have real impacts on domestic political outcomes (Omelicheva 2010).  Terrorism 
alters the rhetoric of policy decision makers and encourages the general public to support the 
state in more forceful counterterrorism strategies.  At the same time, however, terrorism and 




military action, contemporaneously inciting more terrorism.  This challenges earlier International 
Relations literature, as well as current counterterrorism practices, which suggest that 
conventional military force is an effective political response to terrorism (Eppright 1997; 
Kruglanski, Crenshaw, Post, and Victoroff 2007).    
 Finally, the nature of terrorism is changing, more rapidly so in the last few decades, yet 
our understanding of terrorism, its actors, actions, and goals, as well as our methods used to 
combat terrorism, save targeted killings, have hardly evolved.  The general tenets of the 
definition of terrorism have remained the same since the beginning of the temporal range of this 
study as have the general tactics used to combat it, despite the fact that terrorists have new 
motives, new operational capacities, new organizational structures, new tactics, new bargaining 
and recruitment strategies, and new access to technology and media.  Governments must learn 
not only to adapt to the changing face of terrorism, but must be able to anticipate these changes 
for there to be any hope of beating them before they strike.   
 This dissertation situates itself firmly in the existing counterterrorism literature, but spans 
multiple disciplines.  It draws on the research of political science, criminology, and public law to 
present a more complete image of the nature of terrorism and counterterrorism both conceptually 
and in practice in the case of the U.S.  It set out to answer the question of how governments 
respond to terrorism, how they choose which strategies to employ, and how these strategies 
affect other political phenomena. 
 In the future, the theoretical framework for the criminal justice and military models of 
counterterrorism can be applied to cross-national studies, especially to Western style 
democracies.  Though the empirical analysis may need to be augmented to included relevant 




qualitative research in this dissertation may be expanded to examine counterterrorism practices 
in other states.  In addition, the findings suggest more research needs to be done in the vein of 
modeling the interaction between terrorism and government response with respect to the actual 
possibilities of outcomes.   
 This dissertation has shown that governments have many arsenals from which they may 
draw to design counterterrorism policies.  Although, these toolkits may be conceptualized in 
many ways, there are certain advantages, and disadvantages, to thinking about them in terms of 
criminal justice and military components as laid out in the preceding paragraphs.  Within each 
conceptualization exists an array of actors, with many specific procedures, policies, and 
guidelines that help them choose from the plethora of tactics available, and they may choose one 
tactic or model over the other based on the type or location of the attack, the citizenship of the 
perpetrator, or even the utility costs of implementing a long and short range strategies.  No 
matter the choice, the counterterrorism methods used have real implications for domestic 
political processes and social phenomena, which should also come into consideration when 
choosing a response strategy. In addition, the nature of terrorism is evolving and the false 
dichotomy of criminal justice versus military response may force states into dichotomized 
counterterrorism policies that are not making real progress in the prevention and eradication of 
terrorism.  The jury is still out on whether or not counterterrorism strategies are successful in the 
overarching goal of combatting the broad scope of terrorism, but further collection of data and 
expansion of this study into a cross-national one may afford more insight into how effective the 
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